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Abstract 
DEATH PRIMING IN INVESTIGATIONS: THE EFFECTS ON WORLDVIEW THREAT, 
OUT-GROUP DEROGATION, AND STEREOTYPING 
by 
Laure Brimbal 
 
Advisor: Professor Maria Hartwig, Ph.D. 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) hypothesizes that thinking about one’s own death 
creates a need to boost our worldview and our self-esteem in order to cope with this existential 
threat. Decades of research support the theory’s premises with findings in many different settings 
(Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the findings of 
TMT to research on decision making in investigations. In two studies, I evaluated how thinking 
about one’s death (Mortality Salience, MS) affected mock investigators’ reactions to the 
outcome of a case they investigated and their perceptions of a suspect, depending on their group 
memberships. In Study 1, participants (n = 299) were either death primed or not and asked to 
provide their assessment of a case as a police investigator. They were then told of the outcome of 
the case in court (either fair or unfair), asked how they felt about it. They were also asked how 
they would investigate a similar case in the future to assess for the impact of outcome on 
motivational bias. Results showed only an effect for outcome, where participants reacted more 
positively (and less negatively) to the fair outcome then the unfair outcome. Participants also 
showed a tendency to generally seek out more information in the unfair outcome condition; 
however, there was no sign of increased confirmation bias. In Study 2 (n = 403), I either primed 
participants with MS or not and manipulated what role they took on to investigate the case 
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(police investigator or journalist), and the race of the suspect (either in-group or out-group 
member of different races (Black, Hispanic, or White) depending on their own). I then asked 
participants to provide their assessment of the suspect’s culpability and their overall impressions 
of him. Results showed that, contrary to predictions, MS decreased mock police investigators’ 
probability of guilt judgments as compared to those taking on the role of a journalist and those 
not death primed. There was also no clear evidence of increased stereotype use under MS. 
Results were discussed; limitations and avenues for future research were proposed.   
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Chapter 1: Purpose 
Television crime dramas have popularized the cliché of law enforcement officers being 
motivated to bring a criminal to justice after the death of one of their own. Although fictional, 
this example raises the question of how experiencing death can affect our thoughts in ways that 
are more subtle than this obvious reaction of outrage. Specifically, how does contemplating our 
own death impact our decision making processes? The purpose of this dissertation is to answer 
this question in the context of police investigations with mock police investigators assessing 
evidence from a case while under the influence of Mortality Salience (i.e., having thoughts of 
death accessible in their mind). I focused on how death priming (i.e., Mortality Salience; MS) 
affects specific factors that could have biasing effects in an investigation. In Study 1, I examined 
how MS affected investigators’ reactions to a fair or unfair outcome in a case they investigated 
and how this affected their decision making in future investigations. In this study, I measured 
affective responses to verdict and perceived utility of pursuing different types of incriminating, 
exonerating and neutral lines of investigation in future cases. In Study 2, I evaluated how MS 
affected impressions and judgments of out-group members (racial and professional) and the use 
of stereotypes. Of interest for this study was how participants might view a suspect of their racial 
out-group, especially if they were told that their personality matched that of a police investigator 
vs. that of a journalist. Also of interest for this study was how MS might increase the use of the 
“Black criminal” stereotype. The overarching goal of this body of research was to apply decades 
of research on Terror Management Theory (TMT; Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Arndt, 2008) to law enforcement investigations, a field where thoughts of death are 
prevalent and could have very real and serious consequences. 
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Chapter 2: Terror Management Theory – An Overview 
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986; 
Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) proposes an answer to the general question of how death 
unconsciously affects thought processes. TMT is based on the idea that, as humans, we are 
mortal. Further, but more uniquely, as humans, we are aware of this inevitability. Being 
programmed with a survival instinct as most other animals are (Becker, 1973), this awareness of 
an inescapable fate brings us anxiety that we are eager to suppress however we can (Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2008).  
Knowing that death is certain but wanting to survive necessitates that we have cognitive 
mechanisms to protect ourselves from this realization. TMT posits that when thoughts of death 
are present, we react in certain ways to bolster our cultural worldview and self-esteem 
(Greenberg et al., 1993; Landau, Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge, & Arndt, 2009; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Our cultural worldview –the values that our in-
groups hold dear, justifies our existence by providing a purpose and explanation for this 
existence (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2008; Hohman & Hogg, 2015a). Complimentarily, our self-
esteem gives us reason to believe we are fulfilling our role within this cultural worldview 
(Greenberg, 2008). These two factors protect us from thoughts of death by providing us with the 
symbolic immortality of being a useful member to a group that will survive our own death 
(Dechesne et al., 2003). These two factors are important postulates of TMT because they explain 
why thinking of death can result in particular responses. Relevant to this dissertation are findings 
that thinking about one’s death increases negative reactions in response to worldview violations 
3 
 
 
 
and derogation of out-group members (Pyszczynski et al., 2004) – the complete rationale for 
these effects will be discussed in more detail below.  
Terror Management Theory – The Underlying Mechanisms 
Although an increase in negative reactions to worldview violations and derogation of out-
group members might seem illogical on the surface, decades of research support these findings. 
Nonetheless, over the years, researchers have also observed that thinking about one’s death does 
not always provoke these reactions. Researchers exploring the underlying mechanisms of TMT 
developed a dual-defense model (for review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) 
wherein under certain circumstances we cope with explicit thoughts of death with proximal 
defense mechanisms (i.e., defense mechanisms that seek to minimize threat) that result in more 
“rational” ways of coping. These processes include suppressing thoughts of death and denying 
our own vulnerabilities (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000) and are used 
when thoughts of death are consciously accessed and being paid attention to. When asked to 
think about our death, we normally engage in proximal defenses until thoughts of death become 
suppressed. And, once thoughts of death are not the focal point of our attention anymore (but still 
easily accessible in our minds), we engage in distal defense mechanism (i.e., symbolic cultural 
worldview defense; Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997). These distal defense 
mechanisms are the main focus of TMT and this dissertation.  
The dual process model has found support in research showing that the distal effects of 
death priming are stronger when there is a delay after explicit death priming (e.g., having people 
write about their own death). Indeed, people do not show the distal effects when measurement 
immediately follows death priming (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 
1994). Furthermore, when cognitive load is imposed, people show the distal effects of death 
4 
 
 
 
priming (e.g., increased worldview defense, increased pro-American bias in American students) 
even without the delay that is typically observed in TMT research (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Cognitive load increases distal defenses because thought 
suppression is a cognitively costly activity that cannot be constantly maintained. Under normal 
circumstances, a person can distract themselves from thoughts of death for a certain period of 
time, but eventually thoughts will become accessible again. If, for example, one rehearses a 
certain number over and over again after thinking about death, this should impair thought 
suppression activities and thoughts of death should be accessible without delay (Wegner, 1994). 
Further supporting this dual process model is the finding that subliminal death primes (e.g., 
flashing the word death in front of people, priming death without their awareness) increases 
worldview defense and Death Thought Accessibility (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 
1997). 
The Role of Death Thought Accessibility (DTA) 
Originally, TMT posited that the terror that MS creates in us should manifest as death 
anxiety and thus could be measured by people’s affective responses after being death primed. 
However, research on MS has almost always failed to produce differences in affect in response 
to thinking about one’s own death (for one exception, see Arndt, Allen, & Greenberg, 2001). 
After being asked to contemplate their own death, people do not report feeling emotionally 
worse than those who are asked to think about control topics (e.g., going to the dentist, watching 
TV, etc). TMT theorists posited that this is because people suppress the thoughts of death as a 
way to cope with them. As an ironic result of this suppression, however, participants should have 
more unconscious access to thoughts of death. In order to explore this idea, Greenberg and his 
colleagues (1994), inspired by the methods of Bassili and Smith (1986), developed a word 
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fragment completion task to measure unconscious access to thoughts of death (coined Death 
Thought Accessibility; DTA). This task involves participants completing ambiguous word 
fragments with the first word that comes to mind. The word fragments were purposely developed 
so they could be completed either by a death related word (e.g., corpse) or one unrelated to death 
(e.g., course).  
The concept of DTA has helped develop TMT theory and further the understanding of 
MS. For instance, research involving DTA has shown that more than just death (e.g., terrorism; 
see Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004), topics related to death can also increase DTA. People also 
differ in dispositional DTA and certain factors (e.g., low self-esteem) can increase spontaneous 
DTA. Furthermore, DTA has been hypothesized to be a mediator in the MS process (Vail, Arndt, 
Pyszczynski, & Motyl, 2010; for a more comprehensive review of the DTA concept and the 
research surrounding it, see Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010).  
Critique of TMT and Alternative Explanations 
Some critics of the theory claim that because decades of research have been unable to 
measure changes in negative affect in response to MS (for one exception to this, see Arndt et al., 
2001; see also Juhl & Routledge, 2015), that the anxiety (i.e., terror)  stipulated by TMT does not 
exist. However, clarifying the theory, Greenberg, Solomon, and Arndt (2008) explain that 
reactions to MS are coping mechanisms to avoid this anxiety on a daily basis. Thus, the absence 
of anxiety when presented with MS is simply an indication of an individual’s functional 
cognitive management capabilities. This is why alleviating people’s concern about potential 
anxiety by giving participants a placebo said to reduce anxiety nullified the effect of MS on 
reactions to worldview threat (Greenberg et al., 2003).  
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Another frequent critique of TMT is that the effects of MS are not specific to thoughts of 
death and that they can be explained by other threats that can produce similar defensive 
reactions. Arguments have been put forth presenting alternative explanations wherein it is what 
death represents and not death itself that causes the effects. One commonly presented alternative 
is uncertainty, the rationale being that death symbolizes ultimate uncertainty. Research on 
Uncertainty Salience (US) supports the idea that US can produce similar effects as MS. For 
example, van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maasa, Miedema, & van den Hama (2005) found similar 
effects of MS and US on reactions to unfairness (i.e., a worldview violation). However these 
results have not been replicated with different operationalizations of uncertainty or other 
dependent measures (Landau, Johns, et al., 2004; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004; for a 
more thorough review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006), therefore it is 
possible that something unique about unfairness is affected by uncertainty. Other researchers 
have presented other comparable concepts that death evokes and that could explain the effects of 
MS, such as meaninglessness (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Martens, Burke, Schimel, & 
Faucher, 2011) or threat to adaptive coalitions (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005), concern for the 
future (Greenberg et al., 1995), social exclusion, and extreme physical pain (see Vess, Arndt, 
Cox, Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2009). However, many studies show the unique effect of MS, 
replicated using many different constructs of death, such as asking people to reflect upon and 
write about their own death, a picture of a skull (Chopik & Edelstein, 2014), vivid images of 
death (e.g., footage of an autopsy, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992), walking in front of a 
funeral home (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1996), or filling out a survey about personal fear of death 
(Taubman-Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999, Study 2), and subliminal primes (e.g., Arndt, 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997).   
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Furthermore, research supports the unique mediating role of DTA with findings that 
threats to cultural worldview increase the accessibility of death thoughts only, but does not 
increase availability to thoughts about other threats (e.g., Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 
2007). Conversely, when death primed, bolstering participants’ worldview by letting American 
students judge the writers of pro- and anti-American essays reduces DTA compared to those who 
were not given the worldview bolstering opportunity (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997).    
Furthermore, and most relevant to this dissertation, regardless of the discussion over the 
uniqueness of the effects of MS, research over the years has demonstrated the consistent effects 
of MS. I chose to investigate the effects of death priming in investigations because death priming 
is a real issue in the realm of law enforcement and thus should be explored.  
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Chapter 3: Terror Management Theory and Violations of Outcome Fairness 
As proposed by TMT, our cultural worldview serves as a buffer against thoughts of 
mortality. One reason for this is that our cultural values reinforce the idea that the world is a just 
place. Much research shows that we are motivated to view the world as a just place (Lerner, 
1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978): a place where good things happen to people who deserve them 
and bad things happen to bad people (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). When this belief is threatened, for 
example by the idea of death – an ultimately unfair outcome – this makes the concept of fairness 
more salient (Hafer & Bègue, 2005) and we might become more upset when exposed to 
unfairness. This is indeed what research shows: when mortality is salient and people are 
subjected to unfair procedures, they react with more negative and less positive affect than 
without MS (van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Medina, 2000).  
Previous Research on TMT and Fairness  
Several studies have examined the effects of MS on reactions to procedural fairness. In 
four experiments, van den Bos and Miedema (2000) and van den Bos (2001, Study 2) attempted 
to understand the sources of motivation toward fairness. These researchers found that MS 
focused people on concepts of fairness. Giving a voice to participants about how many lottery 
tickets should be awarded to them versus another research participant increased their positive 
affective responses to the procedure. This increase in positive affect was enhanced when 
participants were primed with MS. MS had an even stronger effect in decreasing negative affect 
in response to the procedure. Van den Bos furthered this research by investigating the effect of 
MS on reactions to outcome fairness manipulations in 2001 (Study 1). He replicated the findings 
of MS on procedural fairness: Participants who received more lottery tickets compared to an 
“other” participant showed more negative affect in reaction to this unfair outcome than those 
9 
 
 
 
who received more lottery tickets. The main effect was qualified by an interaction with MS, 
increasing comparative negative affect in participants in the unfair compared to the fair group. 
These results illustrated the power of MS to highlight the importance of not only procedural but 
also outcome fairness. These effects were again replicated in five studies investigating the 
comparative effects of MS, uncertainty, and television watching on reactions to unfairness (van 
den Bos et al., 2005).   
Cook, Arndt, and Lieberman (2004) indirectly tested the idea that MS makes concepts of 
fairness salient by looking at “nullification” beliefs and jurors’ decision making. Nullification 
refers to the distinction between jurors following the spirit versus the letter of the law (see 
Wiener, Habert, Shkodriani, & Staebler, 1991). Those prone to nullification are more likely to 
ignore substantive legal rules and instructions if they disagree with the spirit of the law – because 
they do not see it as fair. Nullification proneness is especially important when evidence relevant 
to a case is judged as inadmissible for procedural reasons (e.g., incriminating evidence that the 
police gathered without a proper search warrant). People high in nullification belief would be 
less likely to disregard this type of evidence because doing so would violate the spirit of the law 
and their concept of fairness. Cook and her colleagues found that MS promoted fairness in 
opposite ways depending on what different people considered fair (i.e., their proneness to 
nullification). Indeed, MS enhanced propensity to follow the spirit of the law for those high in 
nullification belief: these participants were more likely to ignore a judge’s rule to disregard 
inadmissible incriminating information, compared to those low in nullification beliefs (Cook et 
al., 2004).  
Looking specifically at fairness in terms of belief in a just world and following the just 
world rationale, Hirschberger (2006) evaluated the effects of MS on propensity to blame 
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innocent victims. An innocent victim threatens the concept of belief in a just world and MS 
should amplify this threat. This is what Hirschberger found (Study 3, 2006): When presented 
with a story about an innocent driver being harmed in a car crash, participants primed with MS 
assigned more blame to the victim. This was only the case, however, when the driver was 
severely injured and only when it was specified that he had been driving carefully (i.e., a clearly 
innocent badly injured victim). Thus, in an attempt to re-establish their threatened (by MS) belief 
in a just world, participants saw the victim as more culpable than he was.  
TMT and Violation of Outcome Fairness in an Investigation 
Because investigators are a constant instrument in the judicial decision making process, 
they are essentially part of the procedure. Investigators gather the information about a case, 
evaluate it, decide whether or not to forward the information for prosecution and might even be 
asked to testify in court. To that end, the investigators themselves will be concerned with the 
outcome of a case being consistent (and fair) with their own assessment of it. Although past 
research has mostly investigated procedural fairness as a worldview violation, perceptions of 
fairness in general are ingrained in most people’s value systems (Haidt, 2007) and as such should 
be considered an important cultural value (Tyler & Smith, 1998). This means that violating 
someone’s principle of fairness should produce a negative affective response, in the same way 
that a violation of procedural fairness (van den Bos, 2001, Study 2; van den Bos & Medina, 
2000) and of outcome fairness (van den Bos, 2001, Study 1) do. Because MS yields negative 
responses to worldview threats, MS should increase negative affect when exposed to an unfair 
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verdict, especially if the defendant does not deserve it (Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & 
Weinblatt, 1999; Sunshine & Heuer, 2002)
1
. This is the idea that I tested in my first study. 
  
                                                          
1
 It is also possible that MS would increase victim blaming in response to an unfair verdict, given 
Hirschberger’s findings (2006). However, this is beyond the scope of the current studies. 
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Chapter 4: Terror Management Theory and Out-Group Derogation 
Research on TMT also demonstrates the effects that the threat of death can have on how 
people treat others. Generally, we favor individuals who are similar to us (Capozza & Brown, 
2000; Pinter & Greenwald, 2011). Several prominent identity theories (e.g., Social Identity 
Theory; Tajfel & Bilig, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; self-categorization theory; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) posit that we like people in the groups we are a part of and 
dislike people who are not in our groups (e.g., Struch & Schwartz, 1989) because it helps us 
promote our own positive image. This can be explained by the idea that our identity has an 
individual and a social component, both of which affect our self-esteem (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et 
al., 1987). We can boost our social self-esteem by reinforcing the value of in-groups we identify 
highly with (e.g., Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; for review, see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000) 
and derogating members of our out-group (e.g., increased dislike for, distancing from, and 
decreased rated similarity to an out-group member; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; see also Fiske 
& Taylor, 2013). Additionally, threats to our self-esteem (including the threat of death) can 
increase the need for in-group favoritism (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012) and the striving for self-
esteem (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Because self-esteem serves 
as a buffer against the anxiety caused by thoughts of death (Simon et al., 1997) boosting our 
social self-esteem could substitute for personal a self-esteem boost (Castano, Yzerbyt, & 
Paladino, 2004) and act as a buffer against MS. 
Threat Relevance, Group Identification, and Out-group Derogation  
People tend to classify themselves into groups based on different factors such as age, 
gender, and race (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Such groups become part of their members’ identities. 
Out-group members generally threaten one’s worldview by their simple existence because a 
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group other than one’s own implies differences (potentially in terms of worldview) between 
people and thus their mere existence represents a threat to worldview. This threat is especially 
concretized if a member of the out-group overtly threatens one’s worldview. Another important 
factor for an out-group member to provoke a derogation response is identification with the 
threatened group. For example, Branscombe and Wann (1994) found that when Americans were 
exposed to a video that threatened American identity (Rocky, an American, being defeated in a 
boxing match by a Soviet boxer), only those who identified highly as Americans derogated 
Russian out-group members. Furthermore, only those who highly identified as Americans and 
derogated Russians then saw a boost in their self-esteem. Thus, derogating an out-group member 
relevant to the threat at hand can help restore people’s self-esteem when it is damaged (by, say, 
death priming), especially when they identify highly with the threatened in-group (Wann & 
Branscombe, 1990).  
The minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) shows that these 
out-group derogation effects hold even in groups that one has been randomly assigned to, as long 
as one assigns value to the in-group. For example, Tajfel and his colleagues (1971) assigned 
participants to groups based on a bogus status or preference for a certain type of art. Their 
participants then allocated more funds to their in-group and less to their out-group, thus 
illustrating intergroup bias based on random groups that they thought were meaningful. Further 
strengthening the notion that group identity arouses out-group derogation, Billig and Tajfel 
(1973) told some participants that they were randomly assigned to group. They found that the 
simple explicit mention of grouping and group labels resulted in discrimination against out-group 
members, even when participants were aware that they were randomly assigned to groups. 
Finally, Crocker and Schwartz (1985) found that self-esteem interacted with group membership 
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when measuring in-group bias, in these minimal, randomly assigned groups. These findings 
show the general importance of relevance of threat and level of in-group identification on out-
group derogation, before even considering the effects of a threat to self-esteem, such as MS. 
Previous Research on the Effects of MS on Out-group Derogation  
Generally, MS increases our tendency to act favorably toward people we consider 
members of our in-group (e.g., showing more positive attitudes toward charitable organizations 
that were deemed important or even giving more money to domestic charities; Jonas, Schimel, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; see also Castano, 2004; Castano et al., 2002; Harmon-Jones, 
Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). MS also leads people to avoid and derogate members of 
out-groups (e.g., ascribing negative traits, being unwilling to spend time with out-group 
members; Greenberg et al., 1990), and even to act aggressively toward people who challenge 
their belief system (e.g., choosing how much hot sauce to give an individual who does not like 
spicy foods; McGregor et al., 1998). Early research on TMT by Greenberg and his colleagues 
(1990) found that Christians showed more derogation of Jews (a clear out-group) than of 
Christians (their in-group) when under MS. Research has also found that when death primed, 
Scottish students showed more negative attributions toward the English (who are considered 
their out-group; Castano, 2004) and Italian students rated Germans less positively than their own 
group (i.e., Italians; Castano et al., 2002). Looking at ratings of art, Renkema, Stapel, and van 
Yperen (2008) found that Dutch people conformed to other Dutch people’s attitudes about art, 
but they contrasted away from the Germans’ taste in art, when mortality was salient. 
Interestingly, this effect was not found for their conforming to art liked or disliked by Japanese 
people. The explanation for this was that the Japanese were viewed as a neutral out-group to the 
Dutch while the Germans were viewed as a negative out-group. Authors cautioned that this 
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effect could have been comparative, as all participants rated art that was either liked or disliked 
by Germans, Dutch, and Japanese. It is possible that, if presented alone, ratings of Japanese art 
might have been more similar to those of German art. Regardless, however, this illustrates once 
again, that effects are found when the out-group is viewed negatively or as a threat to the in-
group. Similarly, Kugler and Cooper (2010) found that under MS, suspected terrorists were 
awarded less protection by Americans if they were Saudi Arabian than if they were American 
(their in-group) or Bulgarian (an out-group not considered a threat). Although the findings 
outlined above concern groups that are naturally occurring, in-group bias in minimal group 
settings was also enhanced with MS (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Further, MS has been shown to 
increase identification with one’s in-group (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). 
MS, self-esteem and out-group derogation. TMT theory predicts that under MS, self-
esteem should have a moderating effect on out-group derogation. Low self-esteem should 
increase out-group derogation in response to MS while high self-esteem should decrease it. This 
is what findings confirm when manipulating self-esteem: When boosting self-esteem by, for 
example, giving participants positive personality feedback, this attenuated the effects of MS on 
out-group derogation (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Study 1). Findings 
on explicit trait self-esteem measures, however, show mixed results. Harmon-Jones and his 
colleagues (1997, Study 2) found support for this idea: Their American students with high self-
esteem rated an individual who wrote an anti-American essay less negatively than those with 
moderate self-esteem – who were more willing to engage in out-group derogation. This out-
group derogation effect was replicated with Israeli children’s self-reported unwillingness to 
engage in different activities with Russian immigrants (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). The effect 
was only in 11-year olds but not in 7-year olds because the younger children probably did not 
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have full conceptual mastery of the concept of death (Wass, 1995). Out-group derogation was 
also specific to those children with low self-esteem. Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, and 
Vermeulen (2009) also found that prejudice against Arabs increased after watching news about 
terrorist attacks
2
, especially for people low in self-esteem. This was found for people of 
European descent (Study 2), but the authors also found that watching a news report about 
terrorist attacks increased implicit prejudice against all out-group members, as measured by the 
IAT: Europeans for Arabs and Arabs for Europeans (Das et al., 2009, Study 3). On the other 
hand, Baldwin and Wesley (1996) found a reversed moderating effect of self-esteem, where 
Canadian students with high self-esteem (vs. those with low self-esteem) saw an increase in 
polarization of negative opinions toward an out-group member (American target) and positive 
toward an in-group member (Canadian target).  
Bridging the self-esteem and group identification literature, Hohman and Hogg (2015b) 
found that out-group derogation only happened under MS when their participants did not have 
their self-esteem enhanced. Further they found that in-group identification mediated the out-
group derogation effect. That is, among their participants (who were American), those who 
identified most as Americans were those who showed the most in-group bias (as illustrated by a 
larger difference between the evaluations of pro- vs. anti-American essay). Furthermore, research 
on group identities shows that although people can embrace several identities, the most salient 
identity (Halloran & Kashima, 2004) with the most salient norms (Giannakakis & Fritsche, 
2011) is the one that is affected by MS.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 In their study, they used Terrorism Salience (TS), which has shown similar effects as MS 
(Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004) 
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Law Enforcement as a Group Identity 
Taking all of this research into consideration, when evaluating the effect of law 
enforcement as a group identity, one should be sure to evaluate self-esteem and level of group 
identification – that is the extent to which one identifies with the group they were assigned to. 
Furthermore, the salience of both the in-group and the threat to the in-group should be clear. 
Research on police culture seems to indicate that because of job experience, socialization 
(Ankony & Kelley, 1999; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998), and the often dangerous 
circumstances officers are constantly exposed to (Skolnick, 1977; 2000), a sense of community 
develops among officers, that protects them from the byproducts of their work (Paoline, Myers, 
& Worden, 2000; Twersky-Glasner, 2005). This idea of culture supports the idea that law 
enforcement officers should feel that their role as an investigator is an indication of their in-
group and that they would view suspects as out-group members. Therefore, in addition to more 
typical and dominant in-group/out-group distinctions such as race (Ito & Urland, 2003; Yzerbyt 
& Demoulin, 2010) the suspect/investigator group membership distinction should be researched. 
This group identity has the potential to make investigators derogate all suspects, especially when 
under threat of death, resulting in a negativity or even a guilt bias toward suspects. This might be 
one explanation for the idea that criminal investigations themselves induce a guilt presumptive 
approach (Findley & Scott, 2006). This idea is tested in my second study.  
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Chapter 5: Terror Management Theory and the Use of Stereotypes 
An extension of out-group derogation is the use of stereotypes – especially negative ones- 
toward out-group members (Fein & Spencer, 1997; for review, see Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008). 
Stereotypes are generalizations about certain groups of people that can help simplify the world 
and, in the process, make out-group members appear more homogeneous, less individualized 
(Park & Rothbart, 1982), and more negative (Kunda, 1999). Thus, thinking in a more 
stereotypical way about out-group members can be a buffer for the threat that death has on one’s 
self-esteem. Conversely, being threatened with thoughts of one’s own mortality can activate 
stereotypes that might not be otherwise (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). And indeed, under MS, 
people increase their use of stereotypes (e.g., interpreting behavior as stereotypically male; 
Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, & van Yperen, 2008), are more prejudicial (Castano, 2004; 
Greenberg et al., 1990), and show increased preference for members of out-groups who conform 
to prevalent stereotypes (Schimel et al., 1999).   
Past Research on TMT and Stereotypes 
Research on the effects of MS on stereotyping began with Greenberg and his colleagues 
investigating how Christian students rated members of their out-group (i.e., Jews; 1990, Study 
1). Researchers found evidence of not only out-group derogation but also ascription of negative 
stereotypical traits drawn from anti-Semitic literature (e.g., stingy, manipulative, arrogant, 
snobbish, and obnoxious; Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 130). This effect was found only when 
participants were asked to rate their own in-group first. Authors hypothesized that rating an in-
group member first could have reminded participants of the dimension being threatened or this 
rating could have served as an anchor for their ratings of the out-group (Greenberg et al., 1990). 
Following up on this research, Schimel and his colleagues investigated American students’ 
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propensity to stereotype Germans. They asked their participants to ascribe traits to Americans, 
Italians, and Germans. There were several stereotypical traits among these (e.g., unemotional, 
disciplined, proud, hardworking; Schimel et al., 1999) and the researchers found that MS did 
increase the extent to which their participants attributed stereotypical traits (but not non-
stereotypical traits) to Germans over both Americans and Italians. In a second study, Schimel 
and colleagues (1999) examined people’s tendencies to explain gender stereotypical (e.g., “Tom 
paid for their dinner”, p. 911) and counter-stereotypical behavior (“[Tom] baby-sat the 
neighbor’s kids”, p. 911) as a measure of stereotypical thinking. Participants in this study 
provided more explanations of counter-stereotypical behavior (e.g., completing “Mary paid for 
dinner” with “because her boyfriend forgot his wallet”, p. 911) in the MS condition as compared 
to a control. A third study showed that MS increased liking and positive impressions of 
stereotype consistent Black students compared to stereotypically inconsistent Black students and 
compared to control students (Study 3). Schimel and his colleagues replicated this finding with 
stereotypically consistent and inconsistent gay men (Study 5) and males and females applying 
for jobs that were stereotypically gender congruent and incongruent (Study 4). Building on 
Schimel and his colleagues’ investigation of MS and gender stereotypes, Leka (2015) found that 
participants were harsher when judging peers who violated stereotypical gender norms (e.g., a 
woman engineer major) when primed with thoughts of death. Some of these studies showed the 
link between MS and negative stereotyping and others did not find a distinction between the 
increased use of positive and negative stereotypes.  
Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, and colleagues (2008) developed a model to explain this 
distinction. In the presence of only MS, people should seek out structure and try to comprehend 
the world around them. Both positive and negative stereotypes aid in achieving this, as they 
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provide a means to categorize the complex world and simplify it for easier understanding. The 
authors claimed and supported with three studies that the use of negative stereotypes (and 
negative stereotypes only) is most likely when one has a goal of enhancement, which happens 
when a person’s self-esteem is threatened (Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, et al., 2008). This is 
relevant to the current research because I am hypothesizing that the identity of the investigator 
should be in conflict with that of the suspect in a way that, if set free, the suspect should threaten 
an investigator’s identity and self-esteem. Thus, the use of negative stereotypes when judging the 
suspect should be prevalent when under MS. 
The “Black Criminal” Stereotype 
Over the years, much research has investigated how the justice system treats racial groups 
differently (e.g., Hagan, 1987). The overwhelming percentage of falsely convicted Black 
exonerees in the United States is just one example of this disparity 
(www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration; Innocence Project Report, 2000). This begs the 
question of what factors influence false convictions of minorities. One answer is that MS biases 
decision making processes against people stereotyped as criminals and out-group members, at 
the time of investigation. 
Race is a clear group that people tend to identify with and that evokes well-defined 
stereotypes (Schneider, 2004). Relevant to the current proposal is the stereotype of the “Black 
criminal” (Allport & Postman, 1947; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Devine, 1989; 
Duncan, 1976; Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003; Payne, 2001; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; 
Sue et al., 2008). A variety of findings support the existence and pervasiveness of this stereotype. 
In their investigation of juvenile sentencing decisions, Rattan, Levine, Dweck, and Eberhardt 
(2012) found that being primed with the concept of “Black” resulted in more severe sentences 
21 
 
 
 
when compared to being primed with the concept of “White” (Rattan et al., 2012). Additionally, 
the more “stereotypically Black” prisoners looked, the more likely they were to have a longer 
sentence (Viglione, Hannon, & DeFina, 2011) and be sentenced to death (Eberhardt, Davies, 
Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006).  Because the Black criminal stereotype is so prevalent, it is 
important to investigate the effects that MS can have on investigating crimes where the suspects 
are of different races. For example, Graham and Lowery (2004) showed the effects of 
unconscious Black criminal stereotypes. The authors primed police and parole officers with 
stereotypically Black terms (e.g., Harlem, basketball, Black, dreadlocks; Graham & Lowery, 
2004, p. 489) and found that compared to officers in a neutral condition (where they were primed 
with words such as hell, agony, birthday, rainbow; Graham & Lowery, 2004, p. 489) those 
primed with Black terms judged a suspect as more culpable, more likely to recidivate, and 
suggested harsher punishments.  
Further, Glaser, Martin, and Kahn (2015) found that jurors were more likely to convict a 
Black defendant than a white defendant when the death penalty was the harshest punishment 
possible (compared to life without the possibility of parole). Although the authors did not 
explicitly mention TMT in this study, these results reflect the possible impact of death priming. 
Indeed, when life without the possibility of parole was the harshest possible sentence, no 
differences between suspects of different races were found in conviction rates. This is a potential 
illustration of increased use of stereotype (operationalized as increased conviction rates) under 
MS, because the increase in convictions was only present when the death penalty was proposed –
possibly making people contemplate their own death and engage in worldview defense. The idea 
that MS can increase the use of the Black criminal stereotype in criminal investigations is tested 
in my second study.  
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Chapter 6: Terror Management Theory and Legal Decision Making 
The effects of MS have been shown across many areas (Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg et 
al., 1997) such as tanning behavior (Routledge et al., 2004), mate selection and preference 
(Smieja, Kalaska, & Adamczyk, 2006), and creativity (Routledge, Arndt, Vess, & Sheldon, 
2008), to only mention a few. One area that has not been given much attention is that of criminal 
investigations. Apart from looking at the effect of MS on variables related to fairness, research 
on the effect of MS on legally applicable variables has typically been focused on measuring 
decision making at the level of punishment and sentencing. That is to say, once a person is found 
guilty, what kind of punishment do they deserve? Research shows that people who are death 
primed inflict harsher punishments on criminals (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001) and 
set bail higher for prostitutes (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The rationale is that criminals should get 
what they deserve (i.e., be punished) because their guilt is a cultural worldview violation. Indeed, 
death-primed people do not typically approve of law breaking, especially for crimes that violate 
specific worldviews, such as prostitution.  
 In the first published study testing the MS hypothesis, Rosenblatt and his colleagues 
(1989) found that judges who were death primed imposed on average much higher bonds than 
those who were not. The explanation that these results were due to a violation in the judges’ 
belief system was supported with a second study where Rosenblatt replicated the finding with 
students setting higher bonds when under MS, but only when students held negative beliefs 
about prostitution. Although many studies found that MS increases punitiveness (i.e., how harsh 
of a punishment people are willing to bestow upon others), some researchers found that for 
certain types of crimes, the trend was reversed (see Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 2001; Lieberman, Arndt, Personius, & Cook, 2001). Greenberg and his colleagues 
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(2001) found that white people were more lenient toward their racist in-group members when 
primed with thoughts of death. The authors postulated that because hate crimes do not violate 
people’s cultural worldview to the extent that other crimes do, leniency trends were reversed.  
Other studies since the initial Rosenberg findings have evaluated the effect of MS on 
punitiveness and how domain specific individual differences (e.g., personal hardiness (Florian, 
Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001), social dominance orientation (Schimel, Wohl, & Williams, 
2006), empathy (Crawley & Suarez, 2016); for review, see Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon, 
2005) might reduce or increase the impact of MS. To understand the effect of MS on 
punitiveness in different types of crimes, Florian and Mikulincer (1997) developed a 
Multidimensional Social Transgressions Scale (MSTS). The MSTS includes 20 vignette 
descriptions of different transgressions (e.g., robbery, fraud, etc.) that are classified based on the 
consequences of the crime. Each crime was considered as either intrapersonal (i.e., damaging to 
an individual personally, for example getting hit by a car) or interpersonal (i.e., damaging to a 
person’s image within their community, for example a famous pianist’s career being destroyed) 
and rated on severity and degree of punishment warranted. Florian and Mikulincer (1997) used 
this MSTS and replicated the Rosenberg et al. (1989) results: MS increased punitiveness toward 
the culprit. They also found that MS increased perceived severity of the crimes and that 
intrapersonal crimes were perceived as more severe and punished more heavily than 
interpersonal crimes (specific focus of fear of death did moderate this effect, see Florian & 
Mikulincer, 1997).   
Although the effect on punitiveness has been the focus of much TMT in legal settings, it 
is not that of mine. In the aforementioned studies, the guilt of the defendant had already been 
determined. Because I am interested in the effects of MS during the process of investigation, I 
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am more interested in dependent variables that assess probability of guilt of a defendant or 
suspect. Several recent studies have evaluated assessment of guilt, typically finding effects for 
punitiveness but not for guilt. However, these studies focus on jury decision making and not 
investigations (e.g., Beck, 2011; Jones & Weiner, 2011; Knight, 2010). For example, Goodman-
Delahunty, Martschuk, and Ockenden (2015) failed to find an effect of MS on verdict and 
suggested the reasonable doubt standard might have forced rational processing of thoughts of 
death, thus nullifying the effects of MS (Simon et al., 1997). 
The research reviewed in this section is different from mine in two aspects. I mainly 
reviewed literature on sentencing and juror decision making; however, MS could affect decision 
making during an investigation, before a suspect is ever brought to court or convicted. Thus, the 
first main difference is one of measurement. The outcome of a juror’s decision is a dichotomous 
verdict which might not be sensitive enough to register the effects of MS. Indeed, when 
investigating continuous guilt related dependent variables, results were more promising. For 
example, Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, and Scott (1997) found that in a case involving a car accident, 
blame placed on the car manufacturer increased as a function of mortality salience and 
nationality of the manufacturer: Americans blamed a Japanese car company more than the 
American car company, under MS, using a continuous scale of guilt assessment. The nature of 
the investigator’s decision making is much more nuanced than this guilty/not guilty decision 
jurors must make. A police investigator might eventually have to make a decision of whether to 
forward the case to a prosecutor. However, the most important decisions for investigators are 
whether to pursue different lines of investigations or more subtle impressions of suspects that 
might influence the information gathering process. 
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The second distinction relates to the context of the decision making. Participants in my 
studies took on the role of the police investigator in an investigation. This role, as the police 
investigator, is qualitatively different from that of the juror. For a juror, the primary purpose 
should be justice and this might prime concepts of fairness to a higher extent. Conversely, a 
police investigator might have different motivations and might have different norms they should 
abide by as a police investigator. And TMT research shows that priming different norms can 
interact with MS to increase behavior congruent with primed norms (Gailliot, Stillman, 
Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008; Jonas et al., 2008). Furthermore, findings from basic research 
on TMT emphasize the importance of out-group members being a threat to target’s worldview. 
This is key because a guilty suspect going free should be more of a threat to a police 
investigator’s worldview than that of a journalist (the comparison group used in my second 
study).  
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Chapter 7: Decision Making in Investigations 
 Although at times difficult to identify, mistakes in investigator decision making are at the 
root of many miscarriages of justice (Innocence Project Report, 2000; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 
2013; Simon 2012). Research on this fairly new but important field spans from discussing the 
overall process that police undergo during an investigation, to factors (internal and external) that 
can impair the quality or increase the accuracy of the decisions. The research on this topic is 
reviewed below.  
Decision Making in Investigations – The Process 
 Drawing from Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller’s conception of decision making 
phases (1990), O’Brien and Oyserman (2009) proposed that there were two distinctive stages of 
investigatory decision making. The authors suggested that police investigators might start out in 
a deliberative mindset, searching for information and evidence surrounding a crime without a 
specific goal. However, once a potential suspect is found, they switch to an implemental mindset, 
trying to prove that this suspect did indeed commit the crime (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2009). 
Although both deliberative and implemental mindsets serve their purpose and are necessary to 
solve a crime, issues in the process could arise in two ways. First, people in the implemental 
mindset tend to be less open-minded and objective than when in the deliberative mindset 
(Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oetttingen, 2004). Thus, switching mindsets could be problematic if done 
prematurely, before plausible alternative suspects have been properly ruled out. Second, once in 
the implemental mindset, investigators would be less likely to consider criticism of their theory 
about the crime and exculpating evidence. Consequently, engaging in this mindset in general 
could lead to confirmation bias and tunnel vision (see Findley, 2012; Findley & Scott, 2006).  
 Timing of decisional tipping point. Because the timing of the decisional tipping point 
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(i.e., switch between the aforementioned two mindsets) is so important, researchers have 
explored when it occurs and what factors can set it in motion. For example, Fahsing and Ask 
(2013) interviewed a sample of British and Norwegian investigators and found that they indeed 
made decisions according to these two phases. All investigators who were interviewed identified 
naming, arresting, or charging a suspect as a decisional tipping point in their investigations. 
Slightly over half of the investigators also reported their decision to use a certain type of 
investigatory technique to gather case information as a potential typing point. Finally, 
investigators acknowledged that several factors had the potential to influence the timing of the 
tipping point, including the availability of evidence and pressure (both external and internal). 
Fahsing and Ask (2016b) tested whether the decision to arrest a suspect was a tipping point but 
failed to find empirical support for their self-reported data. The presence of the information 
about a suspect’s arrest did not result in the generation of fewer hypotheses, as entering the 
implemental mindset would suggest.  
 Issues of bias in the implemental phase. When scrutinizing the quality of investigatory 
decision making, much research with both lay people and actual investigators, focuses on 
potential for confirmation bias (Evans, 1989; Nickerson, 1998) in the evaluation of investigative 
information (Ask & Granhag, 2005). Criminal cases are typically investigated in a theory-driven 
manner, establishing an initial hypothesis (when in the deliberative mindset) that is then tested in 
a confirmatory way (during the implemental phase), guiding subsequent decisions about the 
investigation (Innes, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 1996; Wagenaar, van Koppen, & Crombag, 
1993). Because the fact-finding mission is almost entirely the responsibility of police, it is 
important that they do not disregard important and potentially exonerating information. Such 
information could be harder to find by the defense or could even be destroyed by the time a 
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defendant goes to trial.  
 Experimentally testing this idea, O’Brien (2009) found that stating a hypothesis, and 
effectively switching from deliberative to implemental mindset, increased confirmation bias – as 
measured by the propensity to seek out confirmatory evidence and disregard disconfirmatory 
evidence. In two studies, she found that stating a hypothesis about a particular suspect’s guilt 
made participants more likely to choose to pursue lines of investigation that would result in 
evidence confirming that suspect’s guilt. Rassin, Eerland, and Kuijpers (2010) also found that 
when holding the hypothesis that a suspect is guilty, participants chose to pursue more 
incriminating than exonerating lines of investigation. These findings suggest that initial ideas can 
affect investigators’ interpretations of ensuing information in a consistent way, as seen in the 
aforementioned studies.  
 Other studies have found evidence of confirmation bias investigations (see Eerland & 
Rassin, 2012; Wallace, 2015). Taking these findings further, Eerland and Rassin (2012) found a 
Feature Positive Effect (FPE; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980) where participants judged 
incriminating evidence as more incriminating than exonerating evidence was exonerating. That is 
to say, when presented with incriminating evidence participants increased their judgements of 
guilt more so than they reduced them when faced with similarly exonerating evidence. If 
investigators do indeed place more weight in incriminating than in exonerating evidence, this 
would lead to an anti-suspect bias, increasing susceptibility to tunnel vision.  
 Of note, certain types of evidence are less prone to the influence of bias. Ask, Rebelius, 
and Granhag (2008) were the first to explore this idea by measuring the elasticity of different 
types of evidence. Elasticity is measured by providing investigators with a case for which they 
are asked to form a judgement. They are then given either a consistent or inconsistent piece of 
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evidence and asked to rate the reliability of said evidence. Ask and his colleagues (2008) found 
that police officers showed signs of asymmetrical skepticism – judging inconsistent evidence as 
less reliable than consistent evidence. Furthermore, this judgment spread to the evidence class in 
general, not only for the specific evidence used in the experiment. Importantly, the authors found 
that certain pieces of evidence were considered more “elastic” (e.g., eyewitness evidence) than 
others (e.g., DNA).  
Characteristics of Good Investigators 
 Some researchers have investigated what individual characteristics make an effective 
investigative decision maker. Westera, Kebbell, Milne, and Green (2016) interviewed detectives 
from Australia and New Zealand about their beliefs of what would make a competent detective. 
Westera and her colleagues (2016) found that the skill rated as most useful was the ability to 
communicate (i.e., that a detective can show empathy, easily establish rapport with people of 
different backgrounds, and can achieve whatever their goal is through communication). Also 
deemed important were motivation (e.g., being passionate about their role as a detective and 
having a desire to seek out justice), thoroughness (e.g., attention to detail and all aspects of the 
job), and decision making skills (e.g., ability to make clear decisions under pressure, open-
mindedness, and ability to consider the big picture; p.10). Interestingly, Fahsing and Ask (2013) 
found that Norwegian investigators mentioned using their intuition as an important tool for good 
decision making, while British investigators did not – and even cited it as source of error. 
Although this difference could be due to variations in policy and training, it still begs the 
question of how individual differences in law enforcement could affect decision making quality.  
 Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk (2006) surveyed law enforcement about the techniques 
they used when making decisions and classified them according to styles that were considered 
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more or less cognitively complex. For instance, the “skill” style, defined as “driven by personal 
qualities and abilities of relating to people at different levels” (Dean et al., 2006, p. 224) is 
considered higher level compared to the “method” style, which was “driven by procedural steps 
and conceptual processes for gathering information” (Dean et al., 2006, p. 224). Investigators 
reported using more sophisticated styles (e.g., skill and risk, being “driven by creativity in 
discovering and developing information into evidence”; Dean at al. 2006, p. 224) when they 
were more experienced. These higher investigative thinking styles were also correlated with 
more creativity in detectives (Dean, Fahsing, & Gottschalk, 2007). More research showed that 
professional experience increased the amount of investigative hypotheses and the number of 
alternative explanations that investigators generated (Fahsing & Ask, 2016b). Other studies have 
also shown benefits of experience (Santtila, Korpela, & Hakkanen, 2004; Wallace, 2015). 
However, factors such as quality of initial training and amount of refresher trainings could also 
be moderating the effect of experience on performance (Fahsing & Ask, 2016b).  
 In terms of cognitive ability, Fahsing and Ask (2016a) found that neither inductive nor 
deductive reasoning ability was related to generation of “gold standard” hypotheses. Ask and 
Granhag (2005) found that criminal investigators’ level of Need For Cognitive Closure (NFCC) 
increased the tendency to ignore alternative explanations in a case where a hypothesis was 
already given. Rassin (2010) replicated these effects with samples of police, district attorneys, 
and judges but did not find the same association between NFCC proneness to bias; instead he 
found an association between a scale of confirmation proneness (TSS) and blindness to 
alternatives.  
Motivational Factors Affecting Decision Making in Investigations 
 In addition to internal factors that could affect an investigators’ ability to make decisions 
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accurately, researchers have also studied the effects of external motivational factors. For 
example, Ask and Granhag (2007a) found that there were differences in information processing 
when investigators were sad or angry. Whereas sad investigators were sensitive to consistencies 
between facts of a case and a witness statement, angry investigators were not. This suggested 
that the angry investigators were processing information heuristically, which would make them 
more prone to error. In another study, anger increased punitiveness compared to sadness and a 
neutral emotion condition (Ask & Pina, 2011). 
 Prior knowledge about an investigation can also bias investigators’ assessment of a 
situation. This is a problem that Kerstholt and Eikelboom (2007) tackled in their study evaluating 
crime analysts in the Netherlands. Crime analysts have a devil’s advocate role (Kray & Galinsky, 
2003) in Dutch investigations. They are to be a neutral party that comes in to provide their 
opinion of a crime and avoid issues of tunnel vision and group think. However, even this 
supposedly neutral party can be influenced by knowledge of their team’s hypothesis. Kerstholt 
and Eikelboom (2007) found that if crime analysts were informed of the hypothesis that their 
team favored, they in turn favored it (i.e., mentioned it more, thought it more likely, and 
considered the suspect of interest as an important person for further investigation).  
 Ask and Granhag (2007b) manipulated time pressure to examine its effect on 
interpretation of evidence. The authors hypothesized and found support for the fact that time 
pressure increased NFCC and asymmetrical skepticism. Alison, Doran, Long, Power, and 
Humphrey (2013) also tested the effect of time pressure on police officers’ decision making. In 
their study, officers who were told they had less time to complete their task, generated fewer 
hypotheses meaning they would be less likely to think of alternative (potentially exculpatory) 
explanations. Time urgency moderated this effect: Officers who perceived that time passes 
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quickly were more affected by the authors’ time pressure manipulation.  
 Finally, Ask, Granhag, and Rebelius (2011) non-consciously activated goals of efficiency 
or thoroughness to examine their effect on investigations. The authors had criminal investigators 
read statements (e.g., “A good investigator often sees the solution to a crime early in the 
investigation”, to prime the goal of efficiency and “a good investigator has the ability to avoid 
premature conclusions about a crime” to prime the goal of thoroughness; Ask et al., 2011, p. 
549) and were told that their colleagues had previously rated and agreed upon these statements. 
Participants in the efficiency condition were not as open to exonerating information as those in 
the thoroughness condition. This was the first study examining non-conscious goal activation 
and the rationale is similar to that of my studies. Because motivational factors have the power to 
affect decision making, even non-consciously, it is important to investigate the effects of death, 
especially given previous findings of TMT research.  
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Chapter 8: The Current Studies 
As an extension of prior TMT research, in this dissertation I examined the effect of a 
potentially powerful biasing factor: death. Specifically, drawing from the findings of TMT 
research, I explored how thoughts of death affected people’s feelings about what they might 
consider an unfair outcome in a case they investigated and how MS affected people’s perceptions 
of a suspect from their in-group or out-group and a suspect who represents certain stereotypes. 
Unconscious influences on the interpretation of evidence are an important issue, one that requires 
research. Knowing what factors can bias the outcome of a case can help prevent these factors 
from impeding investigations in the future and can help educate police officers. This research 
will help understand how MS affects decision making during an investigation.  
The objective of this research was to study the role of MS when lay people, adopting the 
role of police investigators, evaluate case information. Research on the effects of death priming 
on investigatory processes is important for two reasons: Firstly, investigations often involve 
death, which could be affecting investigators. Indeed, thinking about another person’s death can 
cause similar effects as thinking about one’s own death (Pickel & Brown, 2002). However, it is 
true that others found smaller effects when thinking about someone else’s death (Greenberg et 
al., 1994; see also Nelson et al., 1997) and Jones and Weiner (2011) found entirely different 
effects when asking participants to focus on their own death, a victim’s death and a defendant’s 
death. Secondly, and importantly, investigations are performed by law enforcement officers who 
have a very dangerous job. The peril associated with their job might make officers contemplate 
their own mortality to a higher extent than others with safer occupations, leading them to be 
regularly death primed. Finally, this research will increase the applicability of Terror 
Management Theory to yet another setting with severe consequences. The proposed research will 
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answer the questions brought forth in the introductory review by evaluating the variables 
discussed below. 
Variables of Interest 
 This research will attempt to answer the following questions: Does thinking about one’s 
own death increase negative affective responses to an unfair outcome for a case that one has 
investigated (Study 1)? Do these negative emotions then increase motivational bias (specifically, 
confirmation bias) in future investigations (Study 1)? Also, does thinking about one’s own death 
increase out-group derogation of the suspect (when considering one’s own race and professional 
group membership) in an investigation (Study 2)? Finally, does considering one’s own death 
increase the use of the Black criminal stereotype when considering the suspect in an 
investigation (Study 2)? The three main variables of interest when considering these questions 
were adopted from TMT research as they are typically strongly affected by death priming (Burke 
et al., 2010): affective responses to a worldview threat (i.e., unfairness), attitude toward an out-
group member, and stereotypic thinking.  
The first measure of interest in this work was affect. I was interested in whether 
participants became angry in response to a worldview threat, here an unfair outcome of the case 
they were just investigating. I asked participants their opinion about a case after evaluating the 
evidence. Following this assessment, participants were provided with a narrative of the actual 
outcome of the case (as found by a court of law). I then asked participants to report their 
affective reactions (both positive and negative) to this verdict. The assumption here was that 
when a participant made a judgment about the suspect’s guilt, a fair outcome – that the suspect 
deserved – should be consistent with the participant’s decision about the case. Examining how 
investigators react to a fair or unfair outcome in a case (i.e., verdict) that they had investigated 
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will give insight into their motivation to obtain a certain outcome. Failure to obtain this 
important goal should create negative affect (Kruglanski et al., 2002), and, given that MS should 
make concepts of fairness particularly salient, unfairness should provoke an increase in negative 
affect when people are death primed. This is something that needs to be considered carefully. 
When evaluating a case, an investigator will probably have the final outcome of the case in mind, 
at some level. Knowing that an unfair outcome would be displeasing should motivate 
investigators to avoid this at all costs (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Higgins, 1997). This would 
make them more prone to confirmation biases and tunnel vision (Findley, 2012; Findley & Scott, 
2006) especially once they have a hypothesis (Ask & Granhag, 2007b), both of which were 
assessed.  
 To research attitudes toward out-group members and stereotyping, in the context of a 
police investigation, I measured participants’ judgments of guilt of a member of their out-group, 
conceptualized in two different ways. First, the role of investigator should have created an 
identity for participants in which they were identified as a part of the investigation team. Framing 
the role of investigator as an identity was manipulated to amplify the salience of this group 
membership. This type of social identity should have accentuated investigators’ perception of a 
suspect, any suspect, as an out-group member. If this is the case, MS should increase negative 
impressions and derogation of suspects in general. Second, the race of the suspect was varied. 
This served as a second type of out-group manipulation as I was able to compare the 
participants’ (i.e., investigators’) race to the suspect’s race in order to determine whether they 
would be considered an in-group or out-group member.  
 Furthermore, I measured use of racially based criminal stereotypes by assessing how MS 
and the suspect’s race affected the perceived likelihood of him being guilty. Indeed, if 
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participants were using the “Black criminal” stereotype, they should have had a higher number 
of highly confident guilty ratings of Black suspects compared to Hispanic and White suspects. 
As MS increases the use of stereotypes, this effect of guilty Black suspects should have been 
greater when people were death primed. Guilt ratings served as a measurement of stereotype 
activation but also as a measure of out-group derogation. Because the guilt rating was so 
specific, I also used measures of out-group derogation by asking more standard questions to 
evaluate participants’ appraisals of the suspect as a person (e.g., how intelligent and likeable the 
suspect was).  
 The main independent variable of interest in this work was Mortality Salience. That is, I 
manipulated how available death thoughts were. For MS to be most effective, death thoughts 
need to be easily accessible, but below our conscious awareness and not the focus of attention 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999). I included a distraction task between the death priming task and the 
dependent measure(s) to avoid overt reactions to death thoughts (Greenberg et al., 2000). Indeed, 
when dealing with thoughts of death consciously, we use coping mechanism that are considered 
more rational than those described above (Epstein, 1995), such as distracting oneself to minimize 
the thoughts about the threat of death (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 
1994). The main dependent variables of interest are affective responses to fair or unfair 
outcomes, susceptibility to confirmation bias (Study 1), perceived culpability, impressions of a 
suspect, and use of stereotypes (Study 2).  
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Chapter 9: Study 1 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate how MS affected reactions toward the 
verdict in a case participants had made a judgment about. More specifically, I investigated 
whether MS increased affective responses to what could be considered a “fair” (consistent with 
participants’ assessment of the case) or “unfair” (inconsistent with participants’ assessment of 
the case) outcome. Priming people with the idea of their own mortality should impact reactions 
to threats to outcome fairness. In this study, participants were required to make a dichotomous 
decision of whether the main suspect in a case they investigated was guilty or innocent. If, for 
example a participant decided that the suspect was most likely guilty, a fair outcome was 
operationalized by telling participants that the suspect was actually convicted by a court of law. 
An unfair outcome, in this case, was learning that the suspect was cleared of all charges by a 
court of law. This is important because once an investigator makes a decision about the guilt or 
innocence of a suspect they should want to pursue what they consider fair, especially when under 
the influence of MS and in turn be more prone to confirmation bias.  
Hypotheses 
 Main hypotheses. As an extension of TMT research on threats to worldview (Rosenblatt 
et al., 1989), I expected that a threat to participants’ worldview (here, outcome fairness) should 
be received with negative affect. Conversely, an outcome that upholds their worldviews should 
be welcomed positively. These differences should be enhanced by MS. More precisely, I 
predicted a main effect for the case outcome where participants should react generally more 
positively (and less negatively) to a fair verdict than to an unfair verdict. This main effect should 
be qualified by an interaction between prime and case outcome where MS should increase 
positive ratings of affect toward the outcome of a case (and decrease negative ratings of affect 
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toward the outcome of a case) when it is fair. MS will also increase negative ratings of affect 
toward the outcome of a case (and decrease positive ratings of affect toward the outcome of a 
case) if it is unfair (H1a and H1b). For a graphic representation of this interaction, see Figure 1. 
Furthermore, because I proposed that negative affective responses to the case outcome should 
provoke confirmation bias, I hypothesized that affective responses should be related to 
individuals’ tendency toward confirmation bias (H2). Finally, as an illustration of increased 
confirmation bias, I predicted that participants in the unfair condition would seek out more 
incriminating information than exonerating information than those in the fair condition and that 
this effect should be amplified by MS (H3).  
 Moderator hypothesis. My hypotheses rest on the assumption that we are motivated to 
see the world as a just place (Lerner, 1980). However, there are individual differences in this 
motivation (Furnham, 2003). Research on Belief in a Just World (BJW) as an individual 
difference has shown that the more someone endorses BJW (i.e., the higher they are on a BJW 
scale) the more likely they are to help to rectify an injustice (e.g., Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp, 
1991).  Those high in BJW would be highly motivated to see the world as a just place and be 
more upset by injustice than those low in BJW, especially if this injustice was made more salient 
by MS. Thus, I predicted  a three-way interaction between prime, outcome, and BJW, where 
those high in BJW would react more positively to a fair outcome, under MS (compared to those 
low in BJW; H4a). I also predicted a similar three-way interaction between prime, outcome, and 
BJW, where those high in BJW would react more negatively to an unfair outcome, under MS 
(compared to those low in BJW; H4b) .  
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Chapter 10: Study 1 Method 
Participants and Design  
 Participants were 299 community members recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) and paid $1.00 for approximately 20 minutes of their time (M = 22.38 minutes, SD = 
8.68 minutes). Sample size was determined using a power analysis for an expected small effect 
based on previous TMT research on affect dependent variables (r = .21, 95% CI [.10, .32]; Burke 
et al., 2010, p. 29), using non-student populations (r = .25, 95% CI [.18, .32]; Burke et al., 2010, 
p. 29). The sample was 50.2% females and 49.5% males, with an age span from 18 to 73 years 
(M = 36.71, SD = 11.67), and predominantly White (82.3%), then Black (9.7%), Asian (4.3%), 
Hispanic (2%), and other (1.7%).The design was a two (prime: MS vs. Dental Pain (DP)) by two 
(case outcome: fair vs. unfair) between subjects factorial design.  
Procedure 
 After providing informed consent, participants were told that they would be taking part in 
a study on personality and decision making. They were given the “personality assessment” 
portion of the study first. This was a mock personality assessment that incorporated the priming 
manipulation in order to mask its intent. Then, participants were given a case summary to study, 
which is described below. They were then asked to provide their assessment of the suspect in the 
case (guilty or not guilty). This was followed by a short statement telling participants that the 
case was in fact real, that it had gone to court and a jury had provided a verdict (i.e., the outcome 
of the case). This outcome was manipulated depending on which condition the participant was 
randomly assigned to. In the fair condition, they were told that the judgment they provided to the 
court was upheld. In the unfair condition, participants read that the outcome of the case was the 
opposite of their assessment. The verdict was provided without context so as to limit the 
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potential for participants to justify the jury’s decision (e.g., a not guilty verdict resulting from a 
procedural mistake in an otherwise strong case against the suspect might be considered fair for 
someone who has a strong belief in the legitimacy of legal procedures or might not be considered 
fair for someone high in nullification). Finally, participants were asked how they felt about the 
outcome of the case and how they would proceed in the future, given a similar case. The entire 
procedure was administered through an online survey program (Qualtrics), so that participants 
had to go through the materials in order and were reminded if they accidentally skipped 
questions.  
Materials 
 Mock personality assessment. The mock assessment contained questions from the 
Abbreviated form of the Revised Eysenk Personality Questionnaire (EPQR-A; Francis, Brown, 
& Philipchalk, 1992), the Belief in a Just World scale (BJW; Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 
1987), questions from the five-factor model of personality measurement (OCEAN; McCrae & 
Costa, 1987), the priming manipulation, followed by a word search task (to distract those in the 
MS group from overt thoughts of death), and the DTA word fragment completion task as a check 
for the MS manipulation and to assess the level of death thought accessibility.  
 EPQR-A and OCEAN. These measures are typically used to assess personality in 
different ways, but here were used to mask the intent of the MS manipulation and the BJW scale. 
The entire EPQR-A and OCEAN questionnaires were not used because participants’ responses to 
these assessments were not important and I was concerned with losing participants’ interest if the 
personality portion was too lengthy. I only selected 11 questions from the EPQR-A and 14 from 
the OCEAN. Care was taken to take out questions that assessed similar traits, so that the 
questions were not considered too repetitive. Those used for the study are listed in Appendix A.  
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 Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale. The BJW scale assesses the extent to which 
individuals subscribe to the belief that the world is a just place (Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay, & Goch, 
2001; for review, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). This scale was used to test for individual 
differences that might have affected how people respond to outcome fairness.  
 Participants were given the 6 item scale developed by Dalbert and her colleagues (1987) 
to assess their level of BJW by asking them to agree or disagree with statements such as “I am 
confident that justice always prevails over injustice” (α = .90; Full list of questions is in 
Appendix A). Participants’ responses were averaged, resulting in a seven point scale from 1 
(lowest level of BJW) to 7 (highest level of BJW).    
 Priming manipulation. For the priming manipulation, I had participants reflect on and 
write about a topic. Consistent with previous TMT research, the manipulation was framed to 
minimize suspicion. Participants were told that this open-ended assessment was a new type of 
personality test (for the details of this description, see Appendix A). The topic of the open-ended 
questions was either participants’ own death (MS) or another affectively negative experience, 
dental pain (DP). The MS prime involved participants imagining themselves experiencing their 
own death. I asked participants to answer two questions, typically used in TMT research 
(Greenberg et al., 1990, 1993; Rosenblatt et al., 1989): “Please briefly describe the emotions that 
the thought of [your own death/going to the dentist] arouses in you.” and “Jot down, as 
specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically [die/go to the 
dentist] and once you are physically [dead/at the dentist] (Full manipulation is described in 
Appendix A).  
 Distraction task. All participants were given a word search task where they were to find 
six words in a puzzle (the task is displayed in Appendix A). This task was used in order to 
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distract participants in the MS condition from thinking about death and allow time for proximal 
defenses to fade. Participants took on average 110.44 seconds (SD = 65.34) on the distraction 
task.  
 Death Though Access (DTA) manipulation check. After they completed the word search 
task, participants completed a word fragment completion task, in a manner similar to Greenberg 
et al. (1994, Study 4) and Harmon-Jones et al. (1997, Study 3). Participants were asked to 
complete 23 word fragments missing two letters each. Five of these fragments could be filled in 
as either neutral or death related (“buried”/”burned”, “dead”/”deal”, “grave”/”grape”, 
“corpse”/”course”, and “coffin”/”coffee”; Greenberg et al. (1994, p. 634); see Appendix A for a 
list of all the word fragments). For example, coff _ _ could be filled out as coffee or coffin. This 
word fragment completion task served as a manipulation check to ensure that thoughts of death 
were accessible for participants in the MS condition. I summed the number of words that were 
completed in a death related manner in order create a DTA measure with a possible minimum of 
0 and a maximum of 5 – if none or all of the word fragments were filled out with death related 
words.   
 Case summary. The case that was provided to all participants was loosely based on a 
real robbery case retrieved from the National Registry of Exonerations 
(www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration). In my studies, I chose to investigate a case that 
involved no death, so that no thoughts of death, peripheral or proximal, would interfere with my 
manipulation. Furthermore, it was a case that damaged the victim’s personal domain as these are 
typically judged more harshly and given more severe punishments (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). 
The case involved a clearly intrapersonal crime: the victim in the study was assaulted and 
transported to the hospital for traumatic brain injury and the burglar also stole several of her 
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belongings. The case file included a report that described the facts of the case, statements from 
the main suspects’ family members providing him with an alibi, and a forensic report detailing 
DNA evidence found from a mask the robber was thought to be wearing during the robbery. All 
of these pieces of evidence, except for the forensic report, were somewhat ambiguous, with 
elements that seemed to implicate the suspect and elements that exculpated him. The forensic 
report, however, clearly implied the suspect’s guilt so that regardless of any individual 
differences among participants, they should all judge the suspect as guilty and be confident in 
this assessment. For the complete case materials, see Appendix B. The case was pilot tested to 
ensure that we obtained an overwhelming majority of guilty judgments. In a pilot (n = 38), I 
obtained 100% guilty judgments, with fairly high confidence on a scale from 0 to 100 (M = 
87.24, SD = 14.13).  
Dependent Measures 
 Except for the BJW measure, the results of the “personality assessment” portion of the 
study were not used in analyses. In response to the case file, participants provided a dichotomous 
guilt/innocence judgment and their confidence in their guilt assessment. The guilt/innocence 
choice forced participants to commit to one or the other so that when presented with the 
outcome, it clearly contradicted or was consistent with their assessment.  
 The dependent variables provided after participants were told of the outcome of the case 
measured positive (see van den Bos & Miedema, 2000) and negative affect (see van den Bos & 
van Prooijen, 2001) in response to the outcome (“Please rate how you feel about M.'s 
[conviction/acquittal]”). Participants rated the following emotions about the outcome of the case 
on 9 point scales (1 = not all; 9 = extremely): happy, content, satisfied, proud, angry, furious, 
disappointed, guilty, and sad. The negative emotions listed are typically expressed by people in 
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response to unfair outcomes (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). In 
order to assess generally negative and positive reactions to the outcome, two composites were 
created, averaging all positive emotions (happy, content, satisfied, and proud, α = .91; with 1 
being least positive and 9 most positive) and negative emotions (angry, furious, disappointed, 
guilty, and sad, α = .89, with 1 being least negative and 9 most negative). See Table 1 for a 
correlation matrix of these ratings.  
 Additionally, in order to gauge participants’ future intentions regarding investigations 
and potential for motivational bias, I asked them about a hypothetical future case. I asked them 
whether they would gather more evidence in the future before forwarding a similar case to the 
prosecutor (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely). I then asked them to rate how useful they thought 
pursuing different types of evidence would be (1 = very useless; 7 = very useful). In order to 
assess for confirmation bias, I asked specifically about twelve pieces of evidence of three types: 
incriminating, exonerating, and neutral. For a specific list of what these pieces of evidence were, 
see Appendix C). Among these lines of investigation, I included the statement: “This is not a line 
of investigation please select very useful to prove that you are not a robot taking this survey” as 
an attention check – those who responded anything other than “very useful” to this question were 
eliminated from my sample.   
 As a manipulation check to be sure that participants were aware that the verdict in the 
case matched (in the fair condition) or did not match (in the unfair condition) the guilty decision 
they made about the case, I asked them “Did the outcome of the case in court match your 
decision?” Additionally, I asked about participants’ perceptions of the case (how realistic they 
thought it was, how motivated they were to solve it, how much they identified with the role of 
lead investigator) and of the outcome of the case (how fair they found the court’s decision, how 
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deserving they thought the suspect was of the verdict that he received). 
 Finally participants were asked a series of questions about facts that they remembered 
about the case and a series of demographic questions. They were then debriefed, thanked and 
paid through MTurk.  
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Chapter 11: Study 1 Results 
 Participants who failed the attention check (n = 24 total), judged the suspect as innocent 
(n = 20 total; n = 16 in addition to those who failed the attention check), and the fairness 
manipulation check (n = 30 total; n = 21 in addition to those who failed the attention check and 
judged the suspect as innocent) were dropped from analyses. This left us with a sample of 238 
participants with which all of the analyses were conducted.  
Outcome Fairness Manipulation 
 The manipulation of outcome fairness was successful as participants in the fair condition 
(M = 6.08, SD = 1.04) thought that the verdict was fairer than those in the unfair condition (M = 
3.16, SD = 1.39), t (216.57) = 18.30, p < .001, d = 2.38, 95% CI [2.05, 2.72]. Further, those in 
the fair condition (M = 6.10, SD = .99) also thought that the suspect was more deserving of the 
verdict than those in the unfair condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.42), t (208.68) = 20.24, p < .001, d = 
2.63, 95% CI [2.29, 2.98].  
MS Manipulation Check (DTA) 
 I ran an independent samples t-test on DTA to compare the MS group to the DP group. 
Results showed that there was no effect on the overall DTA measure, with no significant 
difference between the MS group (M = 1.32, SD = .88) and the DP group (M = 1.30, SD = .87), t 
(236) = .16, p =.88, d = .02, 95% CI [-.23, .28]. Upon further inspection, none of the individual 
word fragments showed any differences between groups (for more detailed results, see Table 2).  
Main Hypothesis Test (Affect) 
 In order to test my main hypothesis about the effect of MS on affective reactions to a fair 
or unfair outcome (H1), I ran two-way ANOVAs on both positive and negative affect ratings. On 
the positive affect composite, there was a significant main effect for fairness manipulation, F (1, 
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234) = 175.50, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .43, but no effect for priming, F (1, 234) = .83, p = .61, ηp
2
 = .001, 
d = .06, 95% CI [-.19, .32], and no significant interaction between manipulations, F (1, 234) = 
.83, p = .36, ηp
2
 = .004. ). Pairwise comparisons for the ANOVA showed that participants in the 
fair outcome condition responded more positively than those in the unfair condition, d = 1.78, 
95% CI [1.48, 2.08]. No other differences were significant. Bayesian analyses confirmed these 
findings, showing decisive support (Jeffereys, 1961) in favor of the alternative hypothesis for the 
fairness main effect, BF10 = 1.35e +27, but only anecdotal evidence for the priming main effect, 
BF10 = .16, and the interaction between the two, BF10 = .28. However, even though there is 
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis when considering the main effect of priming (BF01 = 
6.33), the results were fairly weak when considering the null hypothesis for the interaction (BF01 
= 3.62). Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 3.  
 On the negative affect composite, there was a significant main effect for the fairness 
manipulation, F (1, 234) = 111.00, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .32, but again no effect for priming, F (1, 234) 
= 1.57, p = .21, ηp
2
 = .007, d = .13, 95% CI [-.13, .38], and no significant interaction between 
manipulations, F (1, 234) = .50, p = .48, ηp
2
 = .002. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
participants in the fair outcome condition responded less negatively than those in the unfair 
condition, d = 1.36, 95% CI [1.08, 1.65]. No other differences were significant. Again, Bayesian 
analyses confirmed these findings, with decisive evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
concerning the fairness main effect, BF10 = 1.81e +18, but only anecdotal evidence for the 
priming main effect, BF10 = .22, and the interaction, BF10 = .24. Again however there was some 
evidence for the null hypothesis when considering the priming main effect (BF01 = 4.53) and the 
interaction effect (BF01 = 4.23). Thus, although there was an effect of fairness on the affect 
measures, H1a and H1b were not supported. Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 3 
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(Overall) and Table 4 (broken down by condition).  
Confirmation Bias 
 Results of a 2 by 2 ANOVA showed that generally, participants reported wanting to 
gather more information in the unfair condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.35) compared to the fair 
condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.72), F (1, 234) = 138.14, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .37, d = 1.52, 95% CI [1.23, 
1.81], but there were no significant effects for prime or the interaction between prime and 
outcome. There was also a general tendency toward confirmation bias, illustrated by a weak but 
significant positive correlation between confidence in verdict and incriminating information (r 
(238) = .16, p = .017) and a weak but significant negative correlation between confidence and 
exonerating information (r (238) = -.15, p = .025). See correlation matrix in Table 5.  
 In order to test my proposition that confirmation bias would be engendered by affective 
responses to case outcome (H2), I ran correlations between affect measures and ratings of 
evidence. Ratings of negative affect were significantly positively related to ratings of usefulness 
of incriminating evidence (r (236) = .25, p < .001), exonerating evidence (r (236) = .22, p = 
.001), and neutral evidence (r (236) = .38, p < .001). Further, ratings of positive affect were 
slightly significantly negatively correlated with ratings of usefulness of neutral evidence (r (236) 
= -.24, p < .001). Full correlation matrix is displayed in Table 5.  
 To examine the effect of my manipulations on my measures of confirmation bias (and to 
test H3), I ran a 2 by 2 by 3 mixed-measures ANOVA on ratings of usefulness of evidence with 
prime and outcome manipulations as between subject variables and type of evidence as a within-
subjects variable. There was a main effect for the outcome manipulation, F (1, 234) = 21.21, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .083. Participants in the unfair condition were more likely to find gathering all types 
of evidence useful, d = .60, 95% CI [.34, .86]. There was also a main effect for evidence type, F 
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(2, 468) = 90.66, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .28. Pairwise comparisons showed that all participants thought 
that gathering incriminating information would be more useful than neutral evidence, d = .60, 
95% CI [.41, .78] and exonerating evidence, d = .88, 95% CI [.69, 1.07]. They also thought that 
gathering neutral evidence would be more useful than exonerating evidence, d = .35, 95% CI 
[.17, .53]. There was also a significant interaction between outcome manipulation and evidence 
type, F (2, 468) = 3.37, p = .035, ηp
2
 = .01. Pairwise comparisons showed that all differences 
were significant. However, because there was no interaction with my prime manipulation, H3 
was not supported. Descriptives for pieces of evidence by condition are in Table 6.  
The Role of Belief in a Just World 
 ANOVAs. In order to examine the effects of BJW (H4a and H4b), I performed a median 
split of participants’ BJW scores. I then conducted two (BJW: High vs. Low) by two (prime: MS 
vs. DP) by two (case outcome: fair vs. unfair) ANOVAs on negative and positive affect. For the 
negative affect composite, again, there was only a main effect for case outcome, where 
participants felt more negatively in the unfair condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.91) than in the fair 
condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.59), F (1, 230) = 109.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .32, d = 1.36, 95% CI [1.08, 
1.64]. No other effects were significant and thus H4a was not supported. Descriptives for this test 
are in Table 7.  
 On the positive affect composite, there was again a main effect of the case outcome 
manipulation. Participants in the fair condition showed more positive emotions (M = 5.98, SD = 
1.91) than those in the unfair condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.54), F (1, 230) = 184.90, p < .001, ηp
2
 
= .45, d = 1.73, 95% CI [1.43, 2.03]. There was also a main effect for BJW: Those higher in 
dispositional BJW generally showed more positive affective responses (M = 4.76, SD = 2.40) 
than those low in BJW (M = 4.28, SD = 2.20), F (1, 230) = 6.77, p = .010, ηp
2
 = .03, d = .21, 95% 
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CI [-.05, .47]. There was also a marginally significant interaction between BJW and the outcome 
fairness manipulation, F (1, 230) = 3.39, p = .067, ηp
2
 = .015. Post hoc analyses showed that both 
high (d = 2.11, 95% CI [1.63, 2.58]) and low BJW individuals (d = 1.51, 95% CI [1.13, 1.90]) 
showed more positive emotions in the fair condition compared to the unfair condition. However, 
high BJW participants showed significantly more positive emotions than those low in BJW in the 
fair condition (d = .54, 95% CI [.17, .91]) but not the unfair condition (d = .11, 95% CI [-.26, 
.47]). No other effects were significant and thus H4b was not supported either. Descriptives for 
this ANOVA are in Table 8.  
 Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of BJW, I 
conducted two multiple regressions. I used the same factors as in my ANOVAs (prime and 
outcome) and included BJW as a continuous predictor of negative and positive affect (on scales 
from 1 to 9). The model for the negative emotions composite was significant, F (7, 230) = 18.65, 
p <.001, R
2 
= .36 and both BJW and outcome fairness significantly predicted negative emotions. 
Participants in the unfair condition reacted significantly more negatively to the verdict than those 
in the fair condition by 2.32, p = .029, and for every increase on the BJW scale, participants 
reacted more negatively to the outcome by .40, p = .028.  
 The model for the positive emotions composite was also significant, F (7, 230) = 28.47, p 
< .001, R
2 
= .46. BJW was again a significant predictor, with every increase in BJW predicting 
an increase in positive emotions of .43, p = .017. The interaction factors of outcome fairness and 
BJW was marginally significant, predicting a decrease in positive affect of .45, p = .070.  
Follow up Questions 
 In order to assess the study for potential confounds and possibly uncover an explanation 
for the lack of effect of the MS manipulation, I ran two-way ANOVAs using prime and fairness 
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outcome as the independent variables and as dependent variables, the follow up questions about 
participants’ assessment of their experience of the case, specifically how realistic the case was, 
how motivated they were to solve the case, and how much they identified with the role of lead 
investigator. See Table 9 for descriptives.  
 Perceived realism of the case. There was a main effect for outcome on perceived 
realism of the case, F (1, 234) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .048, d = .45, 95% CI [.19, .70], where 
those in the fair outcome condition (M = 6.38, SD = .93) thought that the case was more realistic 
than those in the unfair outcome condition (M = 5.95, SD = 1.00). No other effects were 
significant.  
 Motivation to solve the case. There was a marginally significant main effect for 
outcome on participants’ motivation to solve the case, F (1, 234) = 3.55, p = .061, ηp
2
 = .015, d = 
.24, 95% CI [-.02, .50]. Participants in the fair condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.14) reported being 
marginally more motivated to solve the case than those in the unfair condition (M = 5.78, SD = 
1.10). No other effects were significant.  
 Level of identification with role of the investigator. Again, there was a marginally 
significant main effect for outcome on identification with the investigator role, F (1, 234) = 3.32, 
p = .07, ηp
2
 = .014, d = .23, 95% CI [-.03, .49]. Participants reported identifying more with the 
role of the investigator in the fair condition (M = 5.53, SD = 1.43) compared to the unfair 
condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.51). No other effects were significant.  
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Chapter 12: Study 1 Discussion 
 For Study 1, I predicted a main effect for case outcome on affective responses to the 
outcome of a case that participants had investigated – this was supported. Participants reacted 
more positively and less negatively to the fair verdict than to the unfair verdict in the case for 
which they judged a suspect. However, there was no interaction between outcome and prime and 
thus H1 was not supported. There was no significant interaction between conditions on the 
confirmation bias measures, thus H2 was also rejected. BJW interacted with case outcome but 
not with prime, thus also contradicting the idea that dispositional BJW might moderate the effect 
of MS on reactions to unfairness.  
 The main effects that the case outcome had on the follow up questions regarding realism 
of the case, motivation to solve the case, and identification with the role of the investigator could 
partially explain the lack of effects in the unfair condition. If participants did not see the case 
they read as real, were not motivated to solve it, and did not identify with the investigator, they 
might not have seen the unfair outcome as an actual worldview violation. This is especially true 
because lack of realism has been seen as an attenuator of threats to BJW (e.g., Anderson, 1992; 
Gruman & Sloan, 1983). Furthermore, in previous literature, MS had effects on people’s 
reactions to unfair events that affected them personally. It is possible that being personally 
removed from the unfairness mitigated participants’ reactions. It could also be that seeing an 
injustice done to someone else does not threaten an individual’s concept of fairness.  
 The lack of effect of the MS manipulation on DTA is also problematic and suggests that 
participants were not properly death primed. An overview of what participants wrote in response 
to the manipulation questions showed that participants were indeed writing (and thus thinking) 
about their own death. Conversely, those in the DP condition did not write about their death, thus 
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the MS manipulation and control (DP) should have resulted in different levels of DTA. The lack 
of effect of the prime manipulation could possibly be explained by an insufficient distraction 
time. Participants might not have had enough time during the word search task to engage in the 
proximal defenses that are necessary to observe distal defenses such as those I was expecting 
(see Greenberg et al., 1994). Perhaps this potential lack of suppression for those in the MS group, 
coupled with the possibility of those with high DTA in the DP group being death primed through 
the word completion task could have diluted the predicted effects of MS. The word completion 
task could have also brought thoughts of death back to MS participants’ attention, not giving 
them enough time to suppress them again (see Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). This is 
especially true since word completion tasks have been successfully used as a death prime (Zhou, 
Liu, Chen, & Yu, 2008), although these researchers used ten word fragments that could only be 
filled in with death related terms.  
 The lack of effect could also be an issue with the use of affect as a dependent variable. As 
reported by Burke and his colleagues, effects of the MS manipulation on affect measures are not 
as strong as other dependent variables (Burke et al., 2010, p.184) and using a sample of 
participants other than college students also results in smaller effects. Power analyses were 
adjusted for this expected smaller effect size, yet Bayesian analyses found weak support for the 
null hypothesis when testing the interaction between prime and outcome fairness. In contrast 
with previous research on this topic, although my study targeted fairness conceptually, the 
injustice was not experienced by the participants themselves.  
 Finally, one last reason for the lack of effect could be that our fairness manipulation did 
not expose the alternative: In the unfair condition, participants were not explicitly told of the 
alternative to the not guilty verdict (i.e., that the jury could have found the suspect guilty, but did 
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not), although it was implied. This might have made the threat to fairness not as salient for 
participants. Perhaps a better fairness manipulation would have explicitly stated that the jury 
could have chosen to exonerate the suspect but they did not, they convicted him. This would be 
in line with previous research where participants were cognizant of the outcome/procedures that 
the other students experienced (e.g., van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos, & Miedema, 2000). This 
could reflect the findings of Greenberg and his colleagues (1990) where they did not find effects 
when participants were not reminded of the threatened dimension.  
 Given these findings, MS appears not to have affected my mock investigators in the 
predicted ways. However, several limitations may have been caused by the procedures necessary 
to set up the study itself, such as the perceived lack of realism of the unfair verdict. Based on my 
results, several methodological changes were made to the MS manipulation in Study 2 (i.e., 
removing the DTA, adding a distraction task after the MS manipulation). However, I still 
thought it important to investigate the potentially biasing effect of MS on the role of the 
investigator and the identity of the suspect.  
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Chapter 13: Study 2 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to examine another possible way thoughts of death could 
impact decision making in investigations: the effect of MS on evaluations of the suspect in a 
case. TMT research typically finds that under the threat of thoughts of death, people increase 
their out-group derogation (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg, Simon, et al., 1992), in-
group favoritism (e.g., Jonas et al., 2002) and stereotype usage (e.g., Schimel et al., 1999). With 
Study 2, I applied the findings of TMT research to investigatory decision making to answer the 
following questions: How do death-primed participants respond to a suspect who is a member of 
their out-group? How do death-primed people respond to a suspect who represents a certain 
stereotype?  
 I investigated group membership on two levels: The suspect’s and the investigator’s 
group membership. I manipulated what race the suspect was, both because racial identity can be 
a relevant group membership and because I wanted to test for a change in the use of the Black 
criminal stereotype, as discussed above. In order to control for racial in-group/out-group status, I 
asked participants to disclose their race, among other demographics (for more details, see 
Appendix D) and randomly assigned race of the suspect accordingly. Another group that 
participants might have identified with is that of the investigator. By increasing the salience of 
participants’ group membership I attempted to mimic the identity and group membership that 
law enforcement officers experience.  
 One notable difference between Study 1 and Study 2 is that the case that participants 
assessed. All pieces of evidence, including the DNA report, were ambiguous (i.e., did not 
obviously indicate guilt or innocence). Ambiguity of the case was important for several reasons. 
Judgments under ambiguous circumstances are susceptible to biases (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
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Tversky, 1982, see also Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001) that stem from 
motivated cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Kunda, 1990; Trope & Liberman, 1996). As such, 
judgments of an ambiguous case are best for an initial test of the effect of MS on perceptions of 
the suspect. Another reason for the ambiguity of the case was in terms of external validity, when 
considering miscarriages of justice such as innocent suspects being erroneously convicted. One 
would hope that straightforward cases – where a suspect’s guilt or innocence is clear due to the 
amount of incriminating or exculpating evidence – are solved accurately and with little risk of 
false conviction. In cases with potentially ambiguous information, an innocent suspect might run 
the risk of being seen as guilty due to extraneous factors. For an example of the updated case 
used for Study 2, see Appendix E. 
Hypotheses 
 Main hypotheses. Following the results of the TMT research on out-group derogation, I 
predicted that people who were explicitly told to embrace the role of investigator would consider 
the suspect an out-group member to a higher extent than those who were not explicitly engulfed 
in the role. Thus, I predicted a main effect for group membership where participants told to 
embrace the role of police investigator should have more negative and disfavorable views toward 
the suspect and give higher guilt ratings (H1a). This main effect would be amplified by an 
interaction between MS and group membership, in which MS should increase the negative 
perceptions investigators have of the suspects (H1b). Furthermore, there should be a three-way 
interaction of MS, salience of group membership and racial group membership (when 
considering race of participants with race of the suspect) on measures of derogation (H1c). 
Participants for whom mortality is salient and are in the investigator group should be assessing 
the suspect negatively in general, however when the suspect belongs to the participants' racial in-
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group, participants will be motivated to distance themselves from their racial in-group (see 
Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002) and thus rate in-group suspects 
even more negatively than suspects of their racial out-group. This will be contrasted with the 
interaction of the journalist group membership and MS where, participants will not be motivated 
to assess the suspects in their in-group negatively. For a graph of the three-way interaction 
predicted by H1c, see Figure 3.  
 Research on TMT and stereotypes shows that people have a preference for people who 
conform to the stereotypes they hold. The stereotype of African-Americans being criminals is 
prominent (Bodenhausen, 1988; Duncan, 1976; Rector, Bagby, & Nicholson, 1993), more so 
than for Hispanic and White people (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Smith & Dempsey, 1983; 
Wilson, 1996). Furthermore, as participants will be given an ambiguous case, this should 
increase their reliance on stereotypes to inform their decision. Thus, I predicted that when death 
primed and given the opportunity to stereotype, participants will use existing stereotypes to the 
highest extent (H2): There should be an interaction between race of the suspect and prime where 
participants find the Black suspect guilty to a higher extent than other races when participants are 
primed with MS (compared to when primed with DP). For a graph of the interaction predicted in 
H2, see Figure 4.  
 Moderator hypotheses. Several moderating variables have shown effects in TMT 
research and I investigated those most relevant to this study. Self-esteem is at the core of TMT, 
predicting that those low in self-esteem should derogate out-group members to a higher extent 
than those high in self-esteem (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Thus, I predicted that under MS, 
my participants who are low in self-esteem would derogate an out-group suspect (professional or 
racial) more than those high in self-esteem. This should result in three-way interactions between 
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prime, self-esteem, and professional group membership (H3a) and prime, self-esteem, and racial 
group membership (H3b) on measures of out-group derogation.  
 I also hypothesized that following the research on group identification (e.g., Hohman & 
Hogg, 2015b) the effects of MS on out-group derogation will be seen most for those high in in-
group identification, whether it be their level of identification with their assigned professional 
group membership or with their racial in-group. Thus I predicted an interaction between prime, 
professional group membership, and level of identification with their assigned professional group 
(H4a) and another interaction between prime, racial group membership, and level of 
identification with their own race (H4b).  
 Past TMT research has also found that the order in which participants rate their own in-
group and an out-group member moderates MS effects (Greenberg et al., 1990). Reminding 
participants of the dimension being threatened by having them rate their own in-group first 
should increase out-group derogation under MS. Thus, when rating their level of identification 
with their own in-group (either professional or racial) first participants should increase their 
derogation of the suspect. Accordingly, I predicted an interaction between professional group 
membership, order of presentation (i.e., whether participants rated their in-group first or not), and 
prime where those in the police investigator group under MS who rated their professional in-
group first will derogate the suspect to a higher extent than those in the journalist group under 
DP and those who rated the suspect first (H5a). I predicted a similar interaction for those who 
rated their racial in-group first, where those under MS will derogate the (racial) out-group 
suspect to a higher extent than those under DP, rating an out-group suspect first (H5b).   
 Secondary hypotheses. Given previous results examining the effect of MS on 
punitiveness (Arndt et al., 2005), I predicted that MS would increase punitiveness in general and 
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thus there would be a main effect of prime on punitiveness (H6). As an extension of 
punitiveness, I also predicted that MS would increase predictions of recidivism, and there would 
be a main effect of prime on this variable as well (H7).  
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Chapter 14: Study 2 Method 
Participants  
 Participants were 403 community members recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Sample size was determined using a power analysis for an expected medium effect 
based on previous TMT research using attitudinal dependent variables (r = .42, 95% CI [.37, 
.46]; Burke et al., 2010, p. 29) on non-student populations (r = .25, 95% CI [.18, .32]; Burke et 
al., 2010, p. 29). Participants were paid $2.00 for approximately 30 minutes of their time (M = 
23.23, SD = 8.44). The sample was 52.1% females and 46.9% males, between the ages of 19 and 
68 years (M = 37.51, SD = 11.78). Racial breakdown was as follows: 79.4% White, 8.4% Black, 
6.2% Asian, 4.5% Hispanic, and 1.5% other.  
Design 
 This study was a two (prime: MS vs. DP) by two (professional group membership: 
investigator vs. journalist) by three (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White). The suspect 
race manipulation was collapsed into two conditions (racial group membership: in-group vs. out-
group) for certain analyses. This was done by considering participants’ race as well as the race of 
the suspect to which they had been assigned to (e.g., a participant who is White in the Black 
suspect race condition would be in the racial out-group condition).  
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to Study 1 with several small differences: Participants’ were 
given a mock personality assessment (including the prime manipulation), but after they were 
given feedback on their assessment (to manipulate professional group membership), they were 
then given a case summary to evaluate (that was slightly modified from Study 1), they were then 
asked to provide their judgement of the suspect’s guilt, and impressions of him along with 
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measures of racial and professional group identification. Additionally, I did not manipulate 
fairness of the outcome in this study and thus participants were not informed of the final verdict 
in the case. Details of the procedure are described below.  
 MS was manipulated in the same manner as in Study 1 but the personality assessment 
was slightly different: it started with a demographics survey (including a question about the race 
of the participant), questions from the EPQR-A (Francis et al., 1992), the Rosenberg self-esteem 
scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and questions from the five-factor personality assessment (OCEAN; 
McCrae & Costa, 1987), after which feedback was given, providing the manipulation of 
professional group membership. The police investigator group membership manipulation was 
used to increase the salience of participants’ group identification as a police investigator. This 
was done by providing them with bogus feedback for the personality test telling them that their 
personality fit that of a law enforcement investigator. The personality feedback was given before 
the MS to avoid any effects of potentially positive feedback boosting participants’ self-esteem, 
thus nullifying the effects of the MS manipulation (see Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones 
et al., 1997, Study 1).  
 After the personality feedback, I gave the priming manipulation – in the same manner as 
in Study 1, followed by both the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and the word search 
(same as in Study 1). This additional task (the PANAS) was given to allow for further distraction 
from thoughts of death, which might have been needed given the lack of effects in Study 1. 
Indeed, research shows that more distraction tasks between prime and dependent measures 
increase the effects of MS (Burke et al., 2010). Furthermore, because of the concern raised in the 
discussion of Study 1, I did not ask participants to respond to the DTA.  
 Once participants completed the mock personality assessment described above, they were 
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informed that the personality portion was over and that they would now be asked to assess a case 
file. The bogus feedback was followed by short immersion instructions asking participants to 
imagine themselves in the role as the police investigator or the journalist. These instructions 
were used to help ensure that participants assimilated their identity (police investigator or 
journalist) when evaluating the case. The profession of journalist was chosen because it had a 
similar investigative tone to it, without the hypothesized group membership of the police 
investigator identity. To see the exact instructions, see Appendix H.  
 The case used in Study 2 was ambiguous, including the forensic report about the DNA 
evidence found on the perpetrator’s mask. The case summary was pilot tested using MTurk 
workers (n = 71), in order to be sure it was fairly ambiguous in terms of probability of guilt (M = 
61.42%, SD = 26.37; on a scale from 0% to 100%). The case summary was identical for all 
participants except for the suspect race manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either a suspect that was of their racial in-group or out-group. Within the group of participants 
assigned to their racial out-group, half were assigned to a suspect of either race (e.g., if a 
participant was White and assigned to a suspect that was in his or her out-group they had an 
equal likelihood of being assigned to a Black or Hispanic suspect). Participants who reported 
their race as anything other than “Black”, “Hispanic”, or “White”, were randomly assigned to 
race as any race would be considered an outgroup member. The suspect’s racial information was 
subtly incorporated in the case by using stereotypically Black (Jerome, Terrell, and Tyrone), 
Hispanic (Miguel, Ramiro, and Ramon), and White (Marty, Hank, and Brad) names. This type of 
unobtrusive race manipulation has been used successfully in other studies (e.g., Glaser et al., 
2015). Further, the race (Black, Hispanic, or White) was indicated discreetly among other 
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suspect demographic information at the top of the police report to bolster the race manipulation
3
.   
Materials 
 Self-esteem measure. Self-esteem was measured in order to assess for its effects on out-
group derogation, given the mixed results in previous research (see Burke et al., 2010). The 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was used as it is a highly reliable scale that 
measures global self-worth (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997), and is used very often in 
TMT research (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992; Burke et al., 2010, p. 185). The scale is 
comprised of 10 items gaging participants’ feelings about themselves (e.g., “On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself”). Participants were asked to respond to these items on 4-point Likert scales 
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Self-esteem scores were calculated by adding all 
items to each other resulting in scores ranging from 10 to 50 with higher scores indicating higher 
self-esteem (α = .94). For the full scale, see Appendix F.   
 Personality feedback manipulation. This feedback was provided to participants after 
they answered the mock personality assessment and informed participants that given their 
responses to our questions, their personality matched that of a police investigator or a journalist. 
The exact feedback scripts are displayed in Appendix H. The feedback was written to be fairly 
vague and neutral, and was pilot tested (n = 148 MTurk workers) in order to ensure that it did not 
boost participants’ self-esteem and that it did indeed increase identification with the intended 
professional group (i.e., police investigator or journalist).  
 Feedback was piloted in a similar manner as the feedback in Arndt and Greenberg (1999) 
                                                          
3
 Pilot testing indicated that although using stereotypically Black and Hispanic names was 
enough to clearly indicate race for Black and Hispanic suspects, the stereotypically White names 
were not perceived as White the majority of the time. Adding the mention of race on its own was 
also not enough to ensure identification of the suspect’s race. However the combination of name 
and race mention increased pilot participants’ correct identification of the suspect’s race, without 
them being suspicious of the race manipulation.  
64 
 
 
 
and Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) using Arndt and Greenberg’s single item (“How good did the 
personality feedback make you feel about yourself?”; 1999, p. 1334), appropriate elements from 
Heatherton and Polivy’s state self-esteem scale (1991)4 and Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale 
(1965). Although Rosenberg’s scale has historically not been a valid measure of changes in state 
self-esteem, I thought it important to measure for changes in this scale after my feedback since 
this was the measure used to assess global self-esteem in my study. I also used items from the 
state self-esteem scale because this scale is more sensitive to temporary changes and thus might 
detect changes that Rosenberg’s scale would not have. Items from these scales were split in half 
by even (Rosenberg, α = .87; State self-esteem, α = .82) and odd numbered questions 
(Rosenberg, α = .89; State self-esteem, α = .78). I used one half as a pretest and the other half as 
a posttest after the feedback was given (order was counterbalanced). The specific items used are 
listed in Appendix F.  
 Results from the pilot showed that the feedback significantly increased identification with 
the group. Participants who were given personality feedback (M = 5.96, SD = 2.16) identified 
significantly more with their group than those who were not given personality feedback (M = 
4.04, SD = 2.02), F (1, 144) = 9.84, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .06, d = .50, 95% CI [.17, .83]. There was no 
significant main effect for group (police investigator vs. journalist, F (1, 144) = 2.10, p = .149, 
ηp
2
 = .01, d = .22, 95% CI [-.11, .55]) and no significant interaction between group and feedback, 
F (1, 144) = 2.36, p = .126, ηp
2
 = .02, thus people did not feel more affiliated with one group 
more than the other. Results from the pilot also showed that there were no significant differences 
on either self-esteem measure, pre and post feedback. Participants’ scores on Rosenberg’s pretest 
                                                          
4
 In their study, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) used elements that asked specifically about 
academic performance (e.g., “I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read”, p. 
898) and appearance (e.g., “I feel unattractive”, p. 898) that were not appropriate here as the 
interest was more general perceptions of the self.  
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(M = 9.69, SD = 3.46) were no different than their scores on the posttest (M = 9.76, SD = 3.30), t 
(76) = -.23, p = .817, d = .02, 95% CI [-.21, .25]. Participants’ scores on State self-esteem 
questions were no different on the pretest (M = 3.69, SD = .77) than on the posttest (M = 3.62, 
SD = .88), t (76) = 1.13, p = .262, d = .08, 95% CI [-.14, .31].  
 PANAS. Immediately after the prime, participants were given a PANAS questionnaire. 
The PANAS is a tool that assesses participants’ positive and negative affect by asking them to 
rate on 5-point scales (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely) to what extent they are 
experiencing, at the moment, each of twenty words that describe different feelings and emotions 
(e.g., “strong”, “active”, “nervous”, etc.; Watson et al., 1988). Scores for this measure were 
calculated by averaging negative and positive items into two scales: the Positive Affect scale 
(from 1 to 5 with higher scores meaning more positive affect, α = .92) and the Negative Affect 
scale (from 1 to 5 with higher scores meaning more negative affect, α = .93). This was to serve 
as a filler task, so thoughts of death were not the focal point of attention by the time participants 
viewed the case. It also served to make the personality assessment more plausible and to control 
for differences between priming conditions (typically, research finds no differences in affect 
between MS and DP manipulations, Greenberg et al., 2008).  
 Race (name) manipulation. To manipulate race within the case summary, I changed the 
name of the suspect that participants read about, using three stereotypically Black, Hispanic, and 
White names. Past research has used stereotypical names of different races as a successfully 
unobtrusive manipulation of race (e.g., Bertrand & Mulainathan, 2004; Cotton, O'Neill, & 
Griffin, 2008; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). However, the literature does raise 
several issues that were taken into account when choosing names for this study. Research has 
indicated that Black names might prime concepts other than just race such as socio-economic 
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class. Indeed sociologic research shows that the stereotypical names that are used in research 
(e.g., Lamar, Darnel) were not always used in the African-American culture and that their 
emergence was fairly recent. Data also shows that these types of names are more prevalent in 
Black and African-American males who are of lower socio-economic status (Fryer & Levitt, 
2004). Furthermore, from a simple numbers perspective, it is more likely that Black and 
Hispanic names will be less common than stereotypically White names. This could impact 
perceptions of uniqueness and likeability of an individual since familiarity breeds liking 
(Bornstein, 1989).  
 These three factors (socio-economic status, uniqueness, and likeability) were taken into 
account when choosing the names to use in my study. I created a list from names previously used 
in the literature and informally polled people on what stereotypically White, Black, and Hispanic 
names might be. I then consulted the 1990 census list ranking male name popularity 
(http://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.male.first) and rejected names that 
were very popular. For example, Peter had been used in previous research but was ranked 43
rd
, 
whereas the most popular stereotypically Black name (Leroy) was ranked 144
th
. I produced a list 
of 25 names that I then pilot tested with 50 MTurk participants who were each given 6 names to 
rate on 11 items to assess different characteristics of each name that might be a concern for this 
study (i.e., likeability, uniqueness, perceived wealth/class, and perceived race) of each name. 
Questions and response items for each name are displayed in Appendix G.  
 I matched names in terms of perceived likeability, uniqueness, and wealth as well as 
distinctive racial implication (e.g., for a Black name, how Black of a name it was viewed as, 
compared to Hispanic and White). The final names I chose based on this pilot were Jerome, 
Tyrone, Terrell (Black), Miguel, Ramiro, Ramon (Hispanic), and Marty, Hank, and Brad 
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(White), because they were distinctively representative of their racial identity (see Table 10) and 
together they did not differ significantly based on perceived likeability (F (2, 103) = 1.56, p = 
.22, ηp
2
 = .03), uniqueness (F (2, 103) = 1.51, p =.23, ηp
2
 = .03) or wealth (F (2, 103) = .72, p = 
.49, ηp
2
 = .01), see Table 11 for descriptives.   
Dependent Measures 
 In Study 2, I was interested in the effect of MS on participants’ assessment of a member 
of their out-group that was a suspect in a crime. Furthermore, I was interested in how participants 
assessed people who fulfill certain stereotypes, regardless of group membership. Thus, my 
primary dependent variables assessed judgment and impressions of the suspect in the case. 
Unlike in Study 1, I did not measure a dichotomous guilt measure, rather I used a continuous 
measure of probability of guilt (0% = not at all guilty; 100% = completely guilty).  
 The subsequent ratings about the suspect were mapped after Ask and Granhag’s research 
(2005, 2007a, 2007b): “To what extent does the available evidence link the suspect to the 
crime?” (1 = to a very low degree; 9 = to a very high degree); “To what extent were the criteria 
for probable cause fulfilled?” (1 = not at all fulfilled; 9 = completely fulfilled); “How adequate 
was the evidence to prosecute the suspect?” (1 = not at all adequate; 9 = completely adequate). 
These items were highly related and were averaged into a legal decision making scale (α = .92).  
 Further assessing participants’ impressions of the suspect, I asked them to rate him on 9-
point scales of honesty, likeability, intelligence, success, wealth, and dangerousness, adapted 
from Cook and her colleagues’ investigation of jury decision making under MS (2004). In 
addition to these traits I had participants rate traits that could reflect a more stereotypical 
assessment of the suspect, adapted from Graham and Lowery (2004): vulnerability, violence and 
badness. I also added several questions to assess identification with the suspect (adapted from 
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Hohman & Hogg, 2011): “How much would you stand up for the suspect?”, “How much do you 
identify with the suspect?”, and “How similar do you feel to the suspect?” 
 Salience of identity is important for self-categorization purposes (Oakes, 1987; Stets & 
Burke, 2000) and my hypotheses for out-group derogation were based on the fact that police 
investigators should view suspects as out-group members, more so than others (here, journalists). 
I measured the extent to which participants identified with the professional in-group they were 
assigned to during the study and own racial in-group.  
 I evaluated identification with professional group (i.e., journalist or police investigator 
depending on random assignment to condition) using a scale of 8 items, adapted from Hohman 
and Hogg (2011). Participants responded to items such as “How much of a feeling of belonging 
do you have as a [police investigator/journalist]?” on 9-point scales. An additional question was 
added as an attention check (“This is just a test question, select six to show you are not robot.”). 
For the list of specific questions, see Appendix I. Both scales were highly reliable (For the police 
investigator scale, α = .94, and for the journalist scale, α = .95). To assess racial in-group 
identification, I had participants respond to the same items as for professional in-group adapted 
for their racial in-group (i.e., as they reported, Black (α = .97), Hispanic (α = .93), or White (α = 
.94)).  
 Order in which people judge a target and their own in-group has shown some effects in 
the past (Greenberg et al., 1990): Making a target out-group (and threat to in-group) salient is 
important for the threat to be perceived. This can be done by asking people to rate their in-group 
first, before the target. Thus, the order in which the scales were presented was counterbalanced 
with the judgment of the suspect. Half of the time, the suspect was rated first, and the other half 
the suspect was rated second, after either the professional identification scale (a quarter of the 
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time) or the racial identification scale (a quarter of the time). 
 Finally as most reliable results of TMT research have been found on punitiveness, I asked 
participants the severity of the punishment they would recommend for the suspect in the event 
they were found guilty: Participants responded to the question “If found guilty of the armed 
robbery, how severe should the suspect’s punishment be?” on a 7-point scale (1 = very light 
punishment, 7 = very heavy punishment; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). Further, mapped onto 
Graham and Lowery’s likelihood of recidivism scale (2004), I asked participants how likely they 
thought it was that the suspect would commit similar or worse crimes in the future, averaged into 
a measure of likelihood of recidivism (from 1 to 7 with higher values meaning higher likelihood 
of recidivism, α = .91).  
 As manipulation checks, participants were asked which profession the personality 
feedback said they matched with. Participants were also asked how accurate the feedback from 
the personality assessment was, how the feedback made them feel, how motivated they were to 
solve the case, how realistic the case was. They were also asked if they had any prior or current 
law enforcement/investigation experience or if they had ever been a suspect in a crime, and if so, 
whether they were convicted. Finally, participants were asked a series of questions about facts 
that they remembered about the case, including what race the suspect (as a manipulation check) 
and victim were. They were then debriefed, thanked, and paid through MTurk.   
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Chapter 15: Study 2 Results 
 Participants who failed the attention check (n = 10 total), failed the professional group 
manipulation (n = 5 total; n = 4 in addition to those who failed the attention check), and those 
who failed the suspect race manipulation (n = 55 total; n = 50 in addition to those who failed the 
attention check and the suspect race manipulation only) were dropped from analyses. All 
analyses were conducted with this reduced sample of 339 participants.  
PANAS 
 Concordant with TMT research, there were no differences between MS and DP 
conditions on either the Positive (t (337) = .27, p = .791, d = .02, 95% CI [-.20, .23]) or the 
Negative PANAS Scale (t (337) = .14, p = .890, d = .03, 95% CI [-.18, .24]). Thus, the MS 
manipulation had no effect on participants’ reported emotions after thinking about death.  
Suspect Ratings 
 Because the items that I used to assess participants’ impressions of the suspect were taken 
from different research, I thought it necessary to evaluate which variables, if any, formed 
coherent subsets. I performed a principal components analysis with orthogonal (Varimax) 
rotation. Inspection of eigenvalues revealed three components with values higher than 1. The 
correlation matrix is displayed in Table 12 and factor loadings are in Table 13. The first 
component (Negative impressions, α = .94) accounted for 45% of the total variance of the 
original variables and included ratings of dangerousness, violence, and badness. The second 
component (Positive impressions, α = .81) accounted for 16% of the variance and included 
ratings of honesty, likeability, intelligence, success, and wealth. The third component (Perceived 
similarity, α = .86) accounted for 10% of the variance and contained the three answers to 
questions about similarity to suspect. Given the results of this factor analysis I averaged items of 
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each component to analyze them separately. Only perceived vulnerability was left out of these 
scales (and subsequent analyses) because this characteristic did not map well onto any of the 
components.  
Main Hypotheses Testing – Outgroup Derogation 
 In order to test for increased outgroup derogation under MS (H1a, H1b, and H1c), I ran 2 
(prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (racial 
group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVAs on the probability of guilt, legal decision 
making measure, positive impression measure, negative impression measure, and perceived 
similarity to suspect.  
 Probability of guilt. There was only a significant interaction between professional group 
and prime on probability of guilt ratings, F (1, 331) = 4.45, p = .036, ηp
2
 = .01. Post hoc tests 
indicated that probability of guilt was lower for mock police investigators under MS (M = 50.99, 
SD = 25.07) than under DP (M = 60.78, SD = 24.60), d = .39, 95% CI [.09, .70]. Furthermore, 
mock police investigators also had lower probability of guilt under MS than mock journalist 
under MS (M = 60.13, SD = 24.48), d = .37, 95% CI [.07, .67]. No other effects were significant. 
Results did not support any of my hypotheses: although prime and professional group interacted, 
the effect was not in the predicted direction as MS decreased probability of guilt ratings for mock 
police investigators, compared to mock journalists and mock police investigators under DP. See 
descriptives for this test in Table 14.  
 Legal decision making measure. There were no significant effects of the same 2 by 2 by 
2 ANOVA as above on the legal decision making measure, thus H1a, H1b, and H1c were not 
supported using this dependent variable either. See descriptives in Table 14.  
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 Positive impressions of the suspect. There was a marginally significant main effect for 
professional group membership, where those acting as police investigators (M = 3.09, SD = 1.20) 
had more positive impressions than those in the journalist group (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19), F (1, 
331) = 3.06, p = .081, ηp
2
 = .01, d = .18, 95% CI [-.04, .39]. There was also a marginally 
significant interaction between professional group membership and prime, F (1, 331) = 3.60, p = 
.059, ηp
2
 = .01.  Post hoc tests revealed that those evaluating the case as a journalist in DP 
condition (M = 2.68, SD = 1.07) viewed the suspects significantly less positively than those in 
the police investigator DP condition (M = 3.14, SD = 1.19), d = .41, 95% CI [.10, .71]. Those in 
the journalist DP condition also viewed the suspect less positively than the mock journalists in 
the MS condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .62]. No other effects were 
significant, and thus, again H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported, and again, results were 
trending in the opposite direction of what I had predicted. For descriptives, see Table 15.  
 Negative impressions of the suspect. On negative impressions of the suspect, there was 
a main effect for professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 9.13, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .03, d = .31, 
95% CI [.09, .52]. Again, mock journalists (M = 5.58, SD = 2.21) viewed the suspect more 
negatively than mock police investigators (M = 4.91, SD = 2.13). There was also an interaction 
between prime and racial group membership, F (1, 331) = 5.57, p = .019, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests 
revealed that those who responded to an out-group member under MS (M = 4.97, SD = 2.27) 
rated the suspect significantly less negatively than those in the DP group (M = 5.56, SD = 2.10), 
d = .27, 95% CI [-.02, .56]. There was also a marginally significant effect where participants had 
less negative impressions of racial in-group member under DP (M = 4.97, SD = 2.25) than of 
racial out-group member under DP, d = .27, 95% CI [-.04, .58]. No other effects were significant, 
and similarly to with positive impressions of the suspect, there was no support for H1a, H1b, or 
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H1c. In fact, there was again a seemingly ironic effect of MS where it decreased negative ratings 
of out-group suspects (compared to out-group members rated under DP). See descriptives in 
Table 15. 
 Perceived similarity to suspect. Participants rating how similar they felt to the suspect 
showed a main effect for professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 9.41, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .03, d 
= .34, 95% CI [.12, .55].  Those who were told they matched with the personality profile of a 
police investigator (M = 2.90, SD = 1.56) identified with the suspect to a higher extent than those 
who matched with the profile of a journalist (M = 2.39, SD = 1.47). No other effects were 
significant, thus again H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported. See descriptives in Table 15.  
Main Hypotheses Testing – Stereotypes 
 In order to test for the enhanced use of the Black criminal stereotype under MS (H2), I 
ran two 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) 
by 3 (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White) ANOVAs on probability of guilt and legal 
decision making measures.   
 Probability of guilt. There was a significant interaction between prime and professional 
group membership, F (1, 327) = 7.16, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests revealed that mock 
police investigators under MS (M = 50.99, SD = 25.07) thought that it was significantly less 
likely that the suspect was guilty than the mock journalists under MS (M = 60.13, SD = 24.48), d 
= .37, 95% CI [.07, .67]. Furthermore, mock police investigators under MS rated the suspect as 
less guilty than when primed with DP (M = 60.78, SD = 24.60), d = .39, 95% CI [.09, .70].  
 There was also a significant three-way interaction between all independent variables on 
probability of guilt. F (2, 327) = 3.34, p = .037, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests revealed a marginally 
significant effect in the journalist under DP group, where White suspects (M = 64.23, SD =24.50) 
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were viewed as more guilty than Hispanic suspects (M = 51.05, SD = 24.35), d = .54, 95% CI [-
.03, 1.11]. Hispanic suspects rated by mock police investigators were viewed as less guilty under 
MS (M = 47.93, SD = 27.71) than under DP (M = 60.66, SD = 23.75), d = .50, 95% CI [-.04, 
1.03]. Hispanic suspects rated by mock journalists saw the opposite trend where mock journalists 
rating them under MS (M = 64.25, SD = 17.69) saw them as more guilty than under DP (M = 
51.05, SD = 24.35), d = .62, 95% CI [-.02, 1.27]. And, under MS, mock police investigators rated 
Hispanic suspects as significantly less guilty than mock journalist did, d = .68, 95% CI [.09, 
1.28]. Furthermore, Black suspects were rated significantly less guilty by mock police 
investigators when under MS (M = 49.16, SD = 21.99) than when they were under DP (M = 
64.32, SD = 27.14), d = .60, 95% CI [.01, 1.20]. There was also a marginally significant 
difference between mock journalists under MS (M = 61.91, SD = 28.19) and mock police 
investigators under MS, with the latter rating Black suspects lower on probability of guilt, d = 
.49, 95% CI [-.09, 1.06]. None of the existing effects supported H2 and no other effects were 
significant. Descriptives are in Table 16 and a graph of the three-way interaction can be seen in 
Figure 4. 
 Legal decision making measures. The only noteworthy effect on the same ANOVA on 
the legal decision making measure was a marginally significant interaction of prime and 
professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.13, p = .078, ηp
2
 = .01. Post hoc tests revealed 
only one similar simple effect as above: Under MS, mock police investigators (M = 4.65, SD = 
2.18) thought that the evidence against the suspect was not as strong as mock journalists did (M 
= 5.33, SD = 2.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .61]. No other effects were significant, and again these 
findings did not support H2. Descriptives can be found in Table 16.  
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The Effect of Self-Esteem on Out-group Derogation 
MANOVA. In order to assess how self-esteem affected propensity to derogate out-group 
members, I performed a median split of participants based on self-esteem. Scores ranged from 10 
to 39 (M = 19.42, SD = 6.62) with a median score of 20. Low self-esteem participants had scores 
between 10 and 19 and in the high self-esteem group participants had scores of 20 and above. 
Because the suspect rating measures were correlated (see Table 17 for correlation matrix) and I 
was more interested in the overall effect of self-esteem on general impression of the suspect, than 
each individual dependent variable, I conducted a 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) by 2 (prime: MS 
vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (racial group 
membership: in-group vs. out-group) MANOVA on the ratings of the suspect to test H3a and 
H3b.  
There was a significant main effect for professional group membership, F (3, 321) = 4.14, 
p = .007, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp
2
 = .04. Multivariate contrasts showed significant effects for negative 
impressions of the suspect, F (1, 323) = 8.43, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .03, d = .31, 95% CI [.10, .53], 
perceived similarity to the suspects, F (1, 323) = 8.43, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .03, d = .34, 95% CI [.12, 
.55], and a marginally significant effect on positive impressions of suspect, F (1, 323) = 3.24, p = 
.073, ηp
2
 = .073, d = .18, 95% CI [-.04, .39]. Participants assigned to the police investigator 
group rated suspects less negatively (M = 4.91, SD = 2.00) than those in the journalist condition 
(M = 5.57, SD = 2.21) identified with the suspect more (M = 2.90, SD = 1.56) than in the 
journalist condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.47) and gave the suspect more positive ratings (M = 3.09, 
SD = 1.20) than those in the journalist group (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19).  
There was also a significant interaction between prime and professional group 
membership, F (3, 321) = 3.39, p = .018, Wilks’ λ = .97, ηp
2
 = .03. Multivariate contrasts showed 
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that there was only a significant effect for positive impressions of suspect, F (1, 323) = 4.97, p = 
.026, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests were similar to those in the main analyses: Mock journalists rated 
the suspect less positively under DP (M = 2.68, SD = 1.07) than under MS (M = 3.05, SD = 
1.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .62] and mock police investigators under DP (M = 3.14, SD = 1.19) 
rated suspects more positively compared to mock journalists under DP, d = .41, 95% CI [.10, 
.71].  
There was another significant interaction between prime and self-esteem, F (3, 321) = 
2.82, p = .039, Wilks’ λ = .97, ηp
2
 = .03. Multivariate contrasts showed significant effects for 
positive impressions of the suspect, F (1, 323) = 6.47, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .02, and perceived 
similarity with the suspect, F (1, 323) = 6.86, p = .011, ηp
2
 = .02.  Those high in self-esteem 
under MS showed more positive impressions of the suspect than under DP (MMS = 3.23, SDMS = 
1.20 and MDP = 2.83 SDDP = 1.15), d = .34, 95% CI [.04, .64]. They also showed an increase in 
perceived similarity with the suspect when compared to those in the DP condition (MMS = 3.06, 
SDMS = 1.66 and MDP = 2.53, SDDP = 1.49), d = .34, 95% CI [.03, .64]. Ratings of positive 
characteristics (Mlow = 2.86, SDlow = 1.24), d = .30, 95% CI [.00, .60] and perceived similarity 
(Mlow = 2.40, SDlow = 1.49), d = .42, 95% CI [.12, .72] were also higher for those high in self-
esteem when primed with MS (compared to those low in self-esteem). This was not the 
interaction I had predicted in H3a or H3b. However, because those high in self-esteem showed 
less derogation of the suspect under MS when compared to DP and those low in self-esteem, this 
interaction could be viewed as support for my hypotheses, if all participants viewed the suspect 
as an out-group member.   
Finally there was a marginally significant three-way interaction between professional 
group membership, self-esteem, and racial group membership, F (3, 321) = 2.30, p = .078, 
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Wilks’ λ = .98, ηp
2
 = .02. Multivariate contrasts showed only a significant effect for identification 
with the suspect, F (1, 323) = 4.86, p = .028, ηp
2
 = .02. Those high in self-esteem who rated 
racial out-group suspects, identified more with the suspect when taking on the role of police 
investigators (M = 3.01, SD = 1.64) than when taking on the role of journalists (M = 2.18, SD = 
1.31), d = .55, 95% CI [.13, .97]. Those low in self-esteem, rating in-group members identified 
more with the suspect when taking on the role of the police investigator (M = 2.98, SD = 1.79) 
than when taking on the role of the journalist (M = 2.21, SD = 1.41), d = .48, 95% CI [.02, .95]. 
For mock journalists rating in-group members, those with low self-esteem identified less with the 
suspect (M = 2.21, SD = 1.41) than those high in self-esteem (M = 3.05, SD = 1.81), d = .52, 95% 
CI [.06, .98]. Finally mock journalists with high-self-esteem identified more with the suspect 
when he was an in-group member then when he was an out-group members, d = .55, 95% CI 
[.09, 1.02]. However, again, this was not the three-way interaction predicted by H3a or H3b.  
Descriptives for the dependent variables evaluated in this MANOVA, broken down by 
conditions, are displayed in Tables 18 (positive impressions), 19 (negative impressions), and 20 
(perceived similarity to suspect).  
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ self-esteem, I also 
conducted three multiple regressions using the same factors as above (prime, professional group 
membership, and racial group membership), including self-esteem and interactions as factors to 
predict positive and negative impressions of suspect and perceived similarity to the suspect (all 
on scales from 1 to 9).  
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 323) = 1.48, p 
= .111, R
2 
= .02, and prime, professional group membership, racial group membership, and self-
esteem did not predict positive impressions of the suspect.  
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Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was marginally significant, F (15, 323) 
= 1.57, p =.079, R
2 
= .03. Only the interaction between prime and racial group membership 
significantly predicted an increase in of 4.22 in negative impressions of the suspect (p = .035). 
Perceived similarity to the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 323) = 2.20, p 
=.007, R
2 
= .05. Prime significantly predicted perceived similarity to the suspect (p = .018) where 
those in the MS condition saw themselves as less similar to the suspect than those in the DP 
condition by 2.61. The interaction between prime and self-esteem also significantly predicted an 
increase of 1.27 in perceived similarity to the suspect (p = .027). The three-way interaction 
between professional group membership, racial group membership and self-esteem was also 
marginally significant (p = .093) and predicted a decrease in perceived similarity to the suspect 
of .86.  
The Effect of Identification with Professional Group Membership on Out-group Derogation 
MANOVA. In order to account for participants’ level of identification with the 
professional group they were assigned to, scores on the professional identification scale were 
divided by a median split to assess the effect of identification. Scores ranged between 1 and 9 (M 
= 4.41, SD = 2.13) with a median score of 4.00. Low identification participants had scores 
between 1 and 4 and the high identification group had scores of 4.13 and above. Because the 
order in which participants rate their in-group and the target is also important (see Greenberg et 
al., 1990) it was included in the analyses. In order to test H4a and H5a, I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. 
DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (identification level: 
high vs. low) by 2 (order of presentation: suspect first vs. suspect second) MANOVA on positive 
and negative impressions and identification with the suspect, including only participants who 
rated their level of professional identification first or second (n = 185).  
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There was a significant main effects for level of professional group membership, F (3, 
167) = 3.41, p = .019, Wilks’ λ = .94, ηp
2
 = .06, and a marginal main effect for identification with 
profession, F (3, 167) = 2.65, p = .051, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp
2
 = .05. Multivariate contrasts showed 
that the main effect of level of identification was significant for negative characteristics only, F 
(1, 169) = 7.97, p = .005, ηp2 = .05. Participants who identified highly with their assigned 
profession (M = 5.55, SD = 2.16) rated suspects more negatively than those who did not identify 
highly with their assigned profession (M = 4.67, SD = 2.23), d = .40, 95% CI [.11, .7]. The main 
effect on professional group membership was significant for negative impressions of the suspect, 
F (1, 169) = 6.27, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .04, and perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) = 
6.89, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .04. Mock police investigators (M = 4.82, SD = 2.20) rated suspects less 
negatively than mock journalists (M = 5.47, SD = 2.23), d = -.29, 95% CI [-.51, -.08]. Mock 
police investigators (M = 2.77, SD = 1.56) also identified more with suspects than did the mock 
journalists (M = 2.30, SD = 1.41), d = .32, 95% CI [.10, .53].  
There was also an interaction between prime and order of presentation, F (3, 167) = 3.26, 
p = .023, Wilks’ λ = .95, ηp
2
 = .06. Multivariate contrasts showed that there was a significant 
effect for perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) = 12.58, p = .016, ηp
2
 = .03, and there 
was a marginally significant effect for negative impressions of the suspect, F (1, 169) = 16.41, p 
= .057, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests showed significantly higher ratings in perceived similarity with 
the suspect for participants who rated the suspect second in the MS condition (M = 2.99, SD = 
1.75) compared to the DP condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.51), d = .39, 95% CI [-.01, .78]. 
Similarly, those rating the suspect second in the MS condition also rated the suspect marginally 
less negatively (M = 4.81, SD = 2.34) than those in the DP condition (M = 5.42, SD = 2.07), d = 
.28, 95% CI [-.12, .67].  Participants under MS who rated the suspect first (M = 2.21, SD = 1.13) 
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also perceived themselves as less similar to them than those who rated him second, under MS, d 
= .52, 95% CI [.10, .95]. And, again there was a similar marginal effect for negative perceptions, 
where participants who rated the suspect first, perceived him more negatively than if they rated 
him second, under MS (M = 5.41, SD = 2.30), d = .26, 95% CI [-.16, .68].  
There was also a marginally significant interaction between professional group 
membership and level of identification, F (3, 167) = 2.13, p = .098, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp
2
 = .04, 
driven by significant effects on positive impressions, F (1, 169) = 5.43, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .03, and 
perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) = 4.53, p = .035, ηp
2
 = .03. Post hoc tests 
revealed that for both dependent variables, mock police investigators showed significant 
differences from mock journalists among those low in professional identification. Mock police 
investigators in the low identification group rated the suspect more positively (M = 3.25, SD = 
1.01) than mock journalists in the low identification group (M = 2.78, SD = 1.25), d = .41, 95% 
CI [-.04, 86]. They also saw themselves as more similar to the suspect (M = 3.16, SD = 1.64) 
than the mock journalists in the low identification group (M = 2.13, SD = 1.18), d = .74, 95% CI 
[.28, 1.20]. Post hoc tests also revealed that, again, for both dependent variables there were 
similar differences between high and low identification for participants assigned to the police 
investigator role. Mock police investigators in the high identification group (M = 2.76, SD = 
1.16) rated the suspect less positively than those in the low identification group, d = .45, 95% CI 
[.01, .89] and reported feeling less similar to the suspect (M = 2.50, SD = 1.45) than those in the 
low identification group, d = .43, 95% CI [-.01, .87].  
Finally there was a significant four-way interaction between prime, professional group 
membership, order of presentation, and level of identification, F (3, 167) = 4.96, p = .003, Wilks’ 
λ = .92, ηp
2
 = .08, driven by an effect on negative impressions, F (1, 169) = 10.68, p = .001, ηp
2
 = 
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.06. This interaction is graphed in Figure 5, and, very briefly summarized, post hoc tests showed 
very few effects under DP but several complex effects under MS, suggesting that although 
results were not according to my predictions (neither H4a nor H5a) MS caused interaction effects 
with all variables of interest. 
For descriptives, see Table 21 (ratings of positive impressions), Table 22 (ratings of 
negative impressions), and Table 23 (perceived similarity to suspect).  
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of identification 
with their assigned profession, I conducted three multiple regressions in a similar way as for self-
esteem. I used the same factors as in my MANOVA (prime, professional group membership, 
order of presentation) and included level of identification with their profession as a continuous 
predictor of predict positive and negative impressions of suspect and perceived similarity to the 
suspect (again, all on a scale from 1 to 9).  
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 169) = .93, p 
= .534, R
2 
= -.01, and prime, professional group membership, order of presentation, and level of 
group identification did not predict positive impressions of the suspect.  
Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 169) = 2.58, p 
=.002, R
2 
= .11. Two-way interaction factors prime by professional group membership 
interaction (p = .042) and prime by level of group identification (p = .053) were significant and 
predicted increases in negative impressions of the suspect of respectfully 5.89 and 2.55. The 
three-way interaction factors of prime by professional group membership by level of group 
identification (p = .016), prime by professional group membership by order of presentation (p = 
.016) significantly predicted increases in negative impressions of the suspect by respectfully 6.90 
and 2.97. The three-way interaction factor of professional group membership by level of group 
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by order of presentation (p = .061) marginally significantly predicted an increase in negative 
impressions of the suspect by 6.56. Finally, the four-way interaction term also significantly 
predicted an increase in negative impressions of the suspect by 3.46, p = .002.  
Perceived similarity to the suspect. The model was not significant, F (15, 169) = 1.31, p 
= .20, R
2 
= .02, and prime, professional group membership, order of presentation, and level of 
group identification did not predict perceived similarity to the suspect.  
The Effect of Identification with Racial Group Membership on Out-group Derogation 
MANOVA. Scores on the racial identification scale were divided by median split to 
assess for the effect of participants’ level of identification with their own race. Scores ranged 
between 1 and 9 (M = 6.56, SD = 1.79) and a median score of 6.75. Low identification 
participants had scores between 1 and 6.75 and the high identification group had scores of 6.88 
and above. To test H4b and H5b, I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (racial group membership: 
in-group vs. out-group) by 2 (identification level: high vs. low) by 2 (order of presentation: 
suspect first vs. suspect second) MANOVA, including only participants who rated their level of 
racial identification first or second (n = 154).  
 There was a main effect for order of presentation, F (3, 136) = 3.05, p = .031, Wilks’ λ = 
.94, ηp
2
 = .06. Multivariate contrasts showed that this effect was significant for participants’ 
positive impressions of suspects, F (1, 138) = 8.27, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .06, perceived similarity with 
the suspect, F (1, 138) = 6.15, p = .014, ηp
2
 = .04, and marginally significant for negative 
impressions. F (1, 138) = 3.17, p = .077, ηp
2
 = .02. Those rating the suspect second rated him 
more positively (M = 3.35, SD = 1.25) than those rating the suspect first (M = 2.79, SD = 1.15), d 
= .47, 95% CI [.14, .79]. Similarly, they identified more with him (M = 3.13, SD = 1.62) than 
those who rated him first (M = 2.45, SD = 1.45), d = .44, 95% CI [.12, .76], and rated the suspect 
83 
 
 
 
marginally less negatively (M = 5.10, SD = 2.21) than those rating him first (M = 5.56, SD = 
2.08), d = -.21, 95% CI [-.53, .11].  
There was another main effect for level of racial identification, F (3, 136) = 3.44, p = 
.019, Wilks’ λ = .93, ηp
2
 = .07. Multivariate contrasts showed a significant effect for ratings of 
negative impressions only, F (1, 138) = 9.82, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .07. Those who identified highly 
with their own race (M = 5.80, SD = 2.47) rated suspects more negatively than those who did not 
identify highly with their own race (M = 4.90, SD = 1.75), d = .43, 95% CI [.10, .75].  
 Lastly, there was a three-way interaction between racial group membership, identification 
level, and order of presentation, F (3, 136) = 2.84, p = .040, Wilks’ λ = .94, ηp
2
 = .06. 
Multivariate contrasts showed that this effect was significant for positive impression, F (1, 138) 
= 6.27, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .04, and perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 138) = 5.69, p = .018, 
ηp
2
 = .04. Post hoc tests showed similar simple effects for both dependent variables and are 
respectively illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. No other effects were significant, thus, again, there 
was no support for H4b or H5b. Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 24 (for ratings 
of suspect on positive characteristics), Table 25 (ratings of negative characteristics), and Table 
26 (perceived similarity to suspect).  
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of identification 
with their race, I conducted three multiple regressions. I used the same factors as in my 
MANOVA (prime, racial group membership, and order of presentation) and included level of 
identification with their race as a continuous predictor of positive and negative impressions of 
suspect and perceived similarity to the suspect (on scales from 1 to 9).  
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 138) = 1.78, p = 
.043, R
2 
= .07; however no factors significantly predicted positive impressions of the suspect.   
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Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 138) = 1.45, 
p =.134, R
2 
= .04.  
Perceived similarity to the suspect. The model was significant, F (15, 138) = 1.91, p 
=.027, R
2 
= .08. Racial group membership significantly predicted perceived similarity to the 
suspect where participants rating an out-group member viewed themselves as more significantly 
more similar to them (p = .044)  than the suspect in their in-group by 4.09. The two-way 
interaction factor of racial group membership by level of racial identification significantly 
predicted an increase in perceived similarity to the suspect by 6.26, p = .040. Finally, the prime 
by level racial identification (p = .088) and prime by level of racial identification by order of 
presentation (p = .093) interaction factors were marginally significant and respectfully predicted 
increases in .58 and 6.06 in perceived similarity to the suspect.  
The Effect of MS on Punitiveness 
I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. 
journalist) by 2 (racial group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVA on proposed 
severity of punishment to test H6. There was only a marginally significant interaction between 
prime and professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 3.70, p = .055, ηp
2
 = .01. The trend was 
driven by a significant difference between mock police investigators (M = 5.50, SD = 1.15) who 
suggested a higher punishment than mock journalists (M = 5.11, SD = 1.28) under DP, d = .32, 
95% CI [.02, .63]. No other effects were significant, thus H6 was not supported. Descriptives can 
be found in Table 27.  
The Effect of MS on Recidivism 
I also ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. 
journalist) by 2 (racial group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVA on the recidivism 
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composite to test H7. Results supported this hypothesis, showing a significant main effect for 
prime, F (1, 331) = 5.01, p = .026, ηp
2
 = .02, d = .24, 95% CI [.02, .45], where participants under 
MS (M = 2.91, SD = 1.48) thought that the suspect was more likely to recidivate than those in the 
DP condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.32). 
There was also a marginally significant interaction effect between prime and professional 
group membership, F (1, 331) = 3.54, p = .061, ηp
2
 = .01. This trend was driven by mock police 
investigators thinking that if found guilty, the suspect was more likely to recidivate (M = 3.15, 
SD = 1.54) than mock journalists (M = 2.70, SD = 1.48) under MS, d = .30, 95% CI [-.002, .60], 
and mock police investigators under MS thinking that recidivism was more likely than police 
investigators under DP (M = 2.51, SD = 1.22), d = .46, 95% CI [.16, .77]. Descriptives are 
displayed in Table 37. 
Follow up Questions  
In an attempt to understand the counter-intuitive findings that MS decreased probability 
of guilt and increased positive impressions and perceived similarity with the suspect in several of 
my main analyses, I ran analyses directed at assessing potential confounds in the design. I used 
my manipulations as independent variables to run 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group 
membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 3 (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White) 
ANOVAs, on the follow up questions about the case and the feedback. Descriptives for these 
variables are displayed in Table 28.  
Perceived realism of the case. Unlike in Study 1, there were no effects for perceived 
realism of the case.  
Motivation to solve the case. The participants’ motivation to solve the case could have 
been a potential moderator, affecting participants’ assessment of the suspect in the case, as 
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someone playing the role of police investigator might be more motivated to solve the case and 
somehow evaluate evidence more rigorously, giving more weight to exonerating information. 
However, although it might have affected mock police investigators in general, it is unlikely that 
motivation would be affected by MS. And indeed, there was a marginally significant main effect 
for professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.60, p = .059, ηp
2
 = .01, d = .15, 95% CI [-.07, 
.36], where mock police investigators (M = 5.70, SD = 1.35) were more motivated to solve the 
case than mock journalists (M = 5.49, SD = 1.49). However, there was no significant interaction 
between prime and professional group membership, F (1, 327) = .40, p = .529, ηp
2
 = .001.  
Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between race of the suspect and 
professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.20, p = .042, ηp
2
 = .02. Post hoc tests showed that 
for cases concerning a Black suspect, mock police investigators (M = 6.00, SD = 1.23) reported 
being more motivated than mock journalists (M = 5.39, SD = 1.61), d = .42, 95% CI [.03, .82]. 
Mock police investigators also reported being less motivated to solve the case when the suspect 
was White (M = 5.39, SD = 1.47) compared to when he was Black, d = .44, 95% CI [.07, .82]. 
Finally, there was also a marginally significant simple effect where mock police investigators 
reported being more motivated to solve the case with a Black suspect than for a case with a 
Hispanic suspect (M = 5.84, SD = 1.22) and a White suspect, d = .33, 95% CI [-.03, .69].  
There was also a marginally significant interaction between race of the suspect and 
prime, F (1, 327) = 2.67, p = .070, ηp
2
 = .02. The trend was driven by participants who were less 
motivated to solve the case with a White suspect under MS (M = 5.24, SD = 1.27) than when 
under DP (M = 5.79, SD = 1.49), d = .40, 95% CI [.07, .73]. Further, participants under MS 
given a case with a White suspect were less motivated to solve the case than when the suspect 
was Black (M = 5.75, SD = 1.38), d = .39, 95% CI [.03, .75].  
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 Perceived accuracy of the personality feedback. There were no significant effects for 
perceived accuracy of the personality feedback.  
 Reaction to the personality feedback. There was a significant interaction effect between 
prime and professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 4.11, p = .043, ηp
2
 = .01. Post hoc tests 
showed a significant simple effect between mock police investigators and mock journalist under 
DP where mock police investigators (M = 5.61, SD = 2.10) reported feeling better about the 
feedback than mock journalists (M = 4.93, SD = 1.96), d = .33, 95% CI [.03, .64]. There was also 
a marginally significant simple effect for mock police investigators who felt better about the 
feedback in the DP condition than in the MS (M = 5.06, SD = 2.05), d = .27, 95% CI [-.04, .57].   
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Chapter 16: Study 2 Discussion 
For Study 2, I had predicted a main effect of professional group membership, where 
participants told to act like police investigators would view the suspect more negatively and have 
higher guilt ratings than those acting as journalists, and that this effect would be enhanced by an 
interaction with MS. This hypothesis was not supported, as I found that there was no effect of 
professional group membership on the measures of guilt. Furthermore there was a reverse effect 
where participants acting as police investigators had more positive (and less negative) views of 
the suspect and even identified to a higher extent with the suspect than those playing the part of a 
journalist. The interaction effects seen in the analyses were also opposite to what I had predicted. 
Indeed the only significant effect on the guilt dependent variable was an interaction driven by 
mock police investigator participants who showed much lower probability of guilt ratings under 
MS (compared to mock journalists under MS and mock police investigators under DP). 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of the predicted three-way interaction.  
I had also predicted an interaction between race of the suspect and prime. This interaction 
was not significant. However, there was a significant three-way interaction between race of the 
suspect, professional group membership, and prime, driven by mock police investigators under 
MS assigning lower probability of guilt to Black and Hispanic suspects (compared to mock 
journalists under MS and mock police investigators under MS).  
Several of the measures that were expected to moderate the effects of MS (e.g., self-
esteem, level of group identification, and order of presentation of suspect rating) did indeed 
interact with MS; however these effects were not always straightforward. For example, there 
were interactions between prime and self-esteem (in both MANOVA and regression analyses), 
where high self-esteem increased positive ratings of the suspect. However, there were no three-
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way interaction involving group membership and thus, there seemed to be no effect for high or 
low self-esteem increasing or decreasing out-group derogation. Given these results, it is possible 
that all participants, regardless of their racial or assigned professional group membership could 
have conceptualized the suspect as an out-group member, taking away the power of my group 
membership manipulations.  
Furthermore, the main effects of level of group identification replicated in both analyses 
of professional and racial group identification. Those high in professional identification and 
racial identification viewed the suspect more negatively thus generally derogating the suspect 
(perhaps again suggesting that all participants considered the suspect an out-group member) and 
only interacting with prime or group membership in regression analyses. The differences 
between results found between the MANOVA and regression analyses could indicate issues with 
median split technique but could have also indicated that each dependent variable might have 
played significant parts in the MANOVAs, despite not being individually significant.   
Measures of punitiveness also did not show typical MS effects as there was no increased 
demand for severity of punishment under MS. On the other hand, predicted recidivism was 
higher for participants in the MS group as compared to those in the DP group.  
These results are interesting and seem to indicate a more prevalent role of Mortality 
Salience in this study than in Study 1. However, the exact meaning of these results could be 
understood in several ways. When interpreting the results of my analyses on the probability of 
guilt measure, one should consider that the case was piloted at 61.42% probability of guilt and 
thus the recurrent interaction effects seen between prime and professional group membership 
should be interpreted as MS causing a decrease in guilt ratings for those in the police investigator 
condition. One explanation for this effect might be that, unlike what seems to have happened in 
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Study 1, and contrary to what I predicted, taking on the role of a police investigator primed 
thoughts of fairness, made more salient by MS. This in turn might have made mock police 
investigators more attuned to exonerating information and led them to rate the suspect lower on 
probability of guilt. However, this does not fully explain the effects of professional group 
membership on ratings of the suspect. If participants were more attuned to exonerating 
information, why would this result in an increase in perceived similarity with the suspect?  
Given the results of the analyses examining the effects of the race manipulation, it is clear 
that MS had an effect on participants’ assessments’ of the minority suspects (i.e., Black and 
Hispanic). Again, however, this was contingent on professional group membership, where asking 
participants to take on the role of a police investigator somehow made them rate minorities (but 
not White suspects) lower in probability of guilt under MS. It is true that most of my sample was 
White, and therefore this effect might be interpreted as an out-group effect, however the same 
three-way interaction was not significant when analyzing probability of guilt and taking into 
account strictly participants’ racial group membership (as was done in the first set of analyses).  
Alternative explanations for the counter-intuitive findings of the police investigator group 
were explored by analyzing follow up questions. However, findings regarding participants’ 
motivation to solve the case and feelings about the feedback, although interesting did not provide 
an explanation for my results.  
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Chapter 17: General Discussion 
Results from these studies provide limited support for the idea that thinking about one’s 
own death can affect a police investigation. In my first study, I wanted to determine whether 
thinking about death would increase mock police investigators’ negative reaction to an unfair 
outcome for a case they had investigated and if these negative emotions would then lead to 
increased confirmation bias in future investigations. Contrary to my main hypotheses, there were 
no effects at all for my MS manipulation. Participants who were asked to think about their own 
death did not show an increase of negative affect in response to an unfair outcome of the case 
they investigated when compared to those asked to think about going to the dentist. There was 
also limited evidence of increased confirmation bias when faced with an unfair outcome. I did 
find evidence of confirmation bias generally in response to my case – that had been piloted for 
the suspect to be found guilty, however the unfair outcome only increased the likelihood to 
search for any information, not specifically incriminating information. Finally, I had 
hypothesized that individuals’ BJW would moderate my MS effects, however BJW only 
interacted with my fairness manipulation showing that those high in BJW responded more 
positively to a fair outcome than those low in BJW. This finding supports the connection 
between dispositional BJW and differential reactions to outcome fairness, however the lack of 
interaction with MS sheds doubt on the role of dispositional BJW as a moderator for MS. 
In my second study, I attempted to answer questions concerning the role of MS on out-
group derogation (when considering one’s own race and professional group membership) and the 
use of the Black criminal stereotype when considering the suspect in an investigation. In this 
study, I did find effects for MS, however not in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, I had 
hypothesized that taking on the role of police investigator would create a group membership for 
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my participants who would then view all suspects as out-group members, more so than 
journalists. However, participants who acted as police investigators were generally less harsh 
toward the suspect and viewed him more positively than mock journalists did. Furthermore, there 
was no evidence of increased use of stereotypes as I had predicted. Race of the suspect did 
interact with the prime and professional group; however this interaction seemed to indicate 
harsher treatment of minorities for mock journalists under MS and less harsh treatment of 
minorities for mock police investigators under MS.  
This counter-intuitive effect of the participants in the police investigator condition could 
be due to participants being primed with fairness within this context. They could have been 
taking on a “justice role” and as such be primed with consistent norms, promoting them to a 
higher extent under MS (see Gailliot et al., 2008; Jonas et al., 2008). This could explain why they 
would have judged suspects less harshly under MS and could be a potential explanation for their 
treatment of minority suspects.  Participants might have been aware of the current climate of 
police-minority relations and want to remedy by taking on their role. Interestingly, however, this 
would mean that I would have primed fairness through my professional group membership 
manipulation in Study 2. This primed norm would have interacted with MS to produce effects on 
my probability of guilt dependent variable, where in Study 1 my fairness manipulation did not 
interact with MS.  
My predictions regarding moderators in this study were also mostly not supported by the 
analyses. There were some effects of MS interacting with moderators. However, these effects 
were inconsistent and not perfectly aligned with my hypotheses. Self-esteem interacted with the 
prime showing increased derogation of the suspect, in general, but this was not contingent on the 
group membership of the suspect. This, again, might indicate that all participants were regarded 
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as out-group members. It is clear from this second study that MS interacted with several of the 
variables I predicted it would. However, these interactions were rarely in the direction expected, 
and the explanation for these effects has yet to be elucidated.  
The reason for the difference of MS effects in Study 1 and 2 could be explained by the 
methodological adjustments made to the MS manipulation (removal of the DTA measure and 
adding a second distraction task) or the difference in dependent variables, as past research does 
show smaller effects of MS on affective measures compared to attitudinal measures (see Burke et 
al., 2010). Of note, Study 1 took place a month after the terrorist attacks in Paris and thus, this 
could have resulted in a general increase in DTA for both MS and DTA groups, as has been seen 
in past research (e.g., Das et al., 2009; Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004). However there is no way 
to know if the DTA scores in my study are particularly high as DTA scores vary widely between 
studies and there is no standardized measure of what is considered “high” or “low” DTA.  
Because of the difference in dependent variables and rationale between my two studies, 
the lack of effect in Study 1 could be more than just due to methodological adjustments. It could 
also be an indication that the effects seen in previous research on TMT and fairness (e.g., van 
den Bos, 2001) could indeed be due to the confounding effects of being primed with uncertainty 
when contemplating one’s own death. The results of my first study could be seen as more 
support for the idea that the effects seen in past TMT research on reactions to unfairness were 
due to the concept of fairness being particularly important for people facing uncertainty 
specifically, but not death. Reviewing participants’ open-ended responses to the MS 
manipulation, not all participants evoked uncertainty when writing about death. Additionally, 
several participants in the DP condition referred to uncertainty when writing about going to the 
dentist. This overlap could have interfered with my ability to replicate previous findings. A 
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clearer distinction between the thoughts brought about by the control condition and thoughts of 
uncertainty might have been responsible for the past effects of MS on reactions to outcome 
fairness (see van den Bos et al., 2005).  
Limitations and Future Direction 
This body of work is a starting point for examining the effects of MS in police 
investigations. This research, of course, is not without flaws. As stated above, the lack of realism 
in the unfair condition in Study 1 could have been responsible for the lack of effects of MS, 
which would not be an issue if this research was conducted with real cases. Indeed, in reality, a 
police investigator would not question the realism of a case based on an unlikely outcome in 
court. For Study 2, participants were mostly community members asked to take on the role of a 
police investigator (or a journalist) and thus they would have acted in a way that they think a 
police investigator would act, which obviously might be different from the way that police 
investigators actually act. Some doubts have been raised about there being a true police 
personality (Balch, 1972) and research on law enforcement decision making using law 
enforcement samples has found similar effects as studies using lay people (e.g., Ask & Granhag, 
2005; Correll et al., 2007). Thus the way police investigators behave and people think that they 
do might not be that different, however this has yet to be tested. There is however, some 
evidence for organizational socialization, during the police academy and over the years of 
working as a police officer, where motivation declines (e.g., van Maanen, 1975). It is possible 
that my participants acted as enthusiastic young idealistic police investigators motivated to seek 
out justice and primed with fairness which might have made them more conscientious in their 
assessment of the case facts, more careful in guarding against bias, and less likely to ascribe 
guilt, especially toward minorities.  
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The issues in these studies can be addressed in several ways. Taking on the role of police 
investigator did affect participants, and the effects of the role taken, although opposite of my 
predictions, were amplified by MS. The role of police investigator could have affected these 
participants’ responses by priming fairness norms, which would have been enhanced by MS (see 
Gailliot et al., 2008). Future research could seek to identify what norms taking on the role of 
police investigator primed, using a simpler design aimed at examining only MS and possible 
norms that playing the role of a police investigator could prime. A simpler design might also 
help understand the seemingly complex effects of race in this context. Furthermore, a more 
diverse sample might help to understand the racial group dynamics at play.  
Simpler designs and more experimental control would be helpful to resolve the issues in 
my second study. On the other hand, issues with both studies (i.e., lack of realism of the unfair 
outcome in Study 1 and the potentially inaccurate conceptualization of the police investigator’s 
role in Study 2) underscore the importance of pursuing this research in more externally valid 
environments with more specialized populations (i.e., actual law enforcement officers). Although 
this would not allow for as much experimental control, it would be very interesting to consider 
how actual police investigators react to unfair outcomes in cases that they investigate, and how 
their identity as law enforcement influences their assessments of suspects and, of course, whether 
thinking about their own death affects these processes.  
Taking into consideration actual law enforcement populations does raise the question of 
whether or not they would be subject to the effects of MS in the same way that civilians are. 
Indeed, if they are contemplating their own death at higher rates than other populations, law 
enforcement officers could be constantly subject to the effects of death priming. It is also 
possible that they could develop alternative coping mechanism such as dealing with death in a 
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rational manner – which decreases the typical effects of MS as predicted by TMT (e.g., Simon et 
al., 1997). Some research has shown similar effects of MS on active duty military as on general 
population (e.g., van den Berg & Soeters, 2009) however, there is limited research on this topic. 
Further, when considering law enforcement populations and how MS affects them, one would 
have to also take into account factors such as their role in the institution (i.e., beat cop, detective 
in homicide, detective in a white-collar crime division, etc.) and the relative dangerousness of the 
neighborhood they work in to assess the extent to which their job might increase their daily MS 
and change their reactions to death priming.  
Concluding Remarks 
This body of work is the first to examine Terror Management Theory in the context of 
decision making in police investigations, thus filling a gap in the literature. Ultimately, bringing 
these two literatures together could be used to create safeguards against the biasing effects of 
MS. Indeed, this type of work has the potential to identify a source of motivational bias (i.e., 
MS) likely to affect decision making, which is particularly important for law enforcement 
officers considering their work environment. Finding that the effects generally observed in TMT 
research are corroborated for investigative decision making could lead to a deeper understanding 
of the source of bias in context, and improved decision making for law enforcement. In turn, 
knowledge about how MS interacts with factors important to the law enforcement decision 
making process could then help create methods to prevent the influence of MS.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to contemplate the utility of such an endeavor. If it is 
true that thoughts of death bias decision making in investigation, are the types of effects found in 
the literature (and even some found in this research, e.g., order of target rating) really important 
to consider? Would the situations set up in the present body of work arise in the real world? For 
instance, would the concept of a police investigator’s own in-group(s) be particularly salient 
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before he or she judges a suspect, and would this impression of the suspect in turn affect the 
investigator’s decision making about the case? These questions are important to consider when 
thinking about the value of applied research.  
Regardless, it is difficult to imagine that sources of motivational bias, especially those 
like death priming, would not arise in law enforcement contexts, which are reputed to be 
particularly dangerous and likely to provoke thoughts of death. In fact, past TMT research has 
found effects of MS on a large amount of variables, beyond those considered in this dissertation 
(e.g., Burke et al., 2010). With this many different ways that thoughts of death could affect 
decision making, this type of research is invaluable and should be pursued beyond this 
dissertation.   
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Table 1 
Correlation matrix for affect composites and individual affect ratings  
    Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Positive affect 
          
2. Happy .91* 
         
3. Content .90* .72* 
        
4. Satisfied .91* .77* .85* 
       
5. Proud .85* .77* .65* .62* 
      
6. Negative affect -.52* -.45* -.54* -.57* -.27* 
     
7. Anger -.52* -.45* -.55* -.55* -.28* .94* 
    
8. Fury -.47* -.41* -.51* -.53* -.21* .92* .90* 
   
9. Disappointment -.67* -.59* -.66* -.69* -.42* .87* .81* .76* 
  
10. Guilt -.05 -.01 -.07 -.09 .02 .61* .46* .42* .31* 
 
11. Sadness -.45* -.41* -.46* -.50* -.22* .86* .76* .77* .71* .36* 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2 
Descriptives and comparisons of DTA measure and all word fragment between priming groups 
  
Mortality Salience (MS)  
  
Dental Pain (DP) 
  t-test 
n = 122  n = 116 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
 DTA 1.32 0.88   1.3 0.87   t (236) = .16, p = .88 
Buried 0.79 0.41 
 
0.74 0.44 
 
t (236) = .83, p = .41 
Dead 0.32 0.47 
 
0.34 0.48 
 
t (236) = -.41, p = .68 
Grave 0.03 0.18 
 
0.08 0.27 
 
t (198.76) = -1.51, p = .13 * 
Corpse 0.16 0.37 
 
0.11 0.32 
 
t (233.26) = 1.16, p = .25 * 
Coffin 0.02 0.13   0.03 0.16   t (236) = -.51, p = .61 
Note. * For these tests, Levene's test for equality of variances was significant, thus equal 
variances was not assumed 
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Table 3 
Descriptives for composites and individual emotions, overall (n = 238) 
  Mean SD 
Positive 4.49 2.30 
Happy 4.21 2.44 
Content 5.13 2.57 
Satisfied 4.88 2.79 
Proud 3.76 2.50 
Negative 3.54 2.12 
Angry 3.50 2.43 
Furious 3.33 2.48 
Disappointed 4.21 2.81 
Sad 3.64 2.43 
Guilty 3.03 2.54 
Note. Higher values indicate higher levels of each dependent variable 
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Table 4 
Descriptives for composites broken down by condition 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Fair (n = 62)   Unfair (n = 60)   Fair (n = 58)   Unfair (n = 58) 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Positive affect 6.14 1.85 
 
2.94 1.29   5.81 1.98   3.03 1.78 
Negative affect 2.57 1.73   4.81 1.62   2.12 1.40   4.69 2.19 
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Table 5  
Correlation matrix for affect composites, evidence ratings, and confidence in verdict 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Affect composite 
    
1. Negative affect 
    
2. Positive affect -.52** 
    
Type of evidence 
    
3. Incriminating .25** -0.04 
   
4. Neutral .38** -.24** .47** 
  
5. Exonerating .22** -0.06 .35** .55** 
 
6. Confidence 0.08 0.07 .16* -0.08 -.15* 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Descriptives of ratings of the utility of pursuing different evidence types broken down by 
condition 
    Evidence type 
 
 
Incriminating 
 
Neutral 
 
Exonerating 
Condition n Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Fair 
         Death 62 5.25 0.93 
 
4.70 0.93 
 
4.26 1.21 
Dentist 58 5.36 0.87 
 
4.49 0.99 
 
4.34 1.14 
Total 120 5.30 0.90 
 
4.60 0.96 
 
4.30 1.17 
Unfair 
         
Death 60 5.60 0.75 
 
5.27 0.65 
 
4.80 1.08 
Dentist 58 5.54 0.86 
 
5.15 0.89 
 
4.75 1.12 
Total 118 5.57 0.80 
 
5.21 0.77 
 
4.78 1.10 
Total 
         
Death 122 5.42 0.86 
 
4.98 0.85 
 
4.52 1.18 
Dentist 116 5.45 0.87 
 
4.82 0.99 
 
4.55 1.14 
Total 238 5.44 0.86   4.90 0.92   4.53 1.16 
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Table 7 
Descriptives of negative affect composite broken down by condition and Belief in a Just World 
 
Mortality Salience 
(MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Total 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Fair 
           
Low BJW 36 2.39 1.40 
 
33 2.13 1.47 
 
69 2.27 1.43 
High BJW 26 2.82 2.10 
 
25 2.11 1.33 
 
51 2.47 1.79 
Total 62 2.57 1.73 
 
58 2.12 1.40 
 
120 2.36 1.59 
Unfair 
           
Low BJW 30 4.58 1.79 
 
34 4.42 2.36 
 
64 4.49 2.10 
High BJW 30 5.04 1.43 
 
24 5.07 1.91 
 
54 5.05 1.64 
Total 60 4.81 1.62 
 
58 4.69 2.19 
 
118 4.75 1.91 
Total 
           
Low BJW 66 3.38 1.92 
 
67 3.29 2.27 
 
133 3.34 2.10 
High BJW 56 4.01 2.08 
 
49 3.56 2.20 
 
105 3.80 2.14 
Total 122 3.67 2.01   116 3.41 2.24   238 3.54 2.12 
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Table 8 
Descriptives of positive affect composite broken down by condition and Belief in a Just World 
 
Mortality Salience (MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Total 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Fair 
           
Low BJW 36 5.73 1.79 
 
33 5.37 2.15 
 
69 5.56 1.96 
High BJW 26 6.70 1.82 
 
25 6.40 1.59 
 
51 6.55 1.71 
Total 62 6.14 1.85 
 
58 5.81 1.98 
 
120 5.98 1.91 
Unfair 
           
Low BJW 30 2.84 1.39 
 
34 2.96 1.60 
 
64 2.91 1.49 
High BJW 30 3.03 1.19 
 
24 3.11 2.03 
 
54 3.07 1.61 
Total 60 2.94 1.29 
 
58 3.03 1.78 
 
118 2.98 1.54 
Total 
           
Low BJW 66 4.42 2.16 
 
67 4.15 2.23 
 
133 4.28 2.19 
High BJW 56 4.74 2.38 
 
49 4.79 2.45 
 
105 4.76 2.40 
Total 122 4.56 2.26   116 4.42 2.34   238 4.49 2.30 
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Table 9 
Descriptives for Study 1 follow up questions, broken down by condition 
 
Mortality Salience (MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Total 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Perceived realism of case 
         
Fair 62 6.34 1.01 
 
58 6.43 0.84 
 
120 6.38 0.93 
Unfair 60 5.92 1.00 
 
58 5.98 1.07 
 
118 5.95 1.03 
Total 122 6.13 1.02 
 
116 6.21 0.98 
 
238 6.17 1.00 
Motivation to solve case 
         
Fair 62 6.02 1.19 
 
58 6.09 1.08 
 
120 6.05 1.14 
Unfair 60 5.88 1.01 
 
58 5.67 1.18 
 
118 5.78 1.1 
Total 122 5.95 1.11 
 
116 5.88 1.14 
 
238 5.92 1.12 
Identification with the lead investigator role 
       
Fair 62 5.48 1.41 
 
58 5.59 1.45 
 
120 5.53 1.43 
Unfair 60 5.18 1.51 
 
58 5.19 1.53 
 
118 5.19 1.51 
Total 122 5.34 1.46   116 5.39 1.50   238 5.36 1.48 
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Table 10 
Descriptives for perceived racial identity of names, broken down by stereotypically Black, 
Hispanic, and White names  
  
Black ratings 
 
Hispanic 
ratings  
White ratings 
 
Comparative 
race 
  n Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Black names 
         
Blackness 
Lamar 12 6.08 1.00 
 
2.67 1.44 
 
2.33 1.37 
 
1.08 3.03 
Terrell 11 5.82 0.87 
 
2.45 1.21 
 
2.27 1.27 
 
1.09 3.21 
Darnel 12 5.00 1.76 
 
2.42 1.83 
 
2.67 1.15 
 
-0.08 3.75 
Jerome 11 5.36 1.29 
 
2.45 1.69 
 
2.91 1.51 
 
0.00 3.55 
Tyrone 12 6.00 0.95 
 
2.50 1.17 
 
2.33 1.07 
 
1.17 2.86 
Leroy 13 5.31 1.18 
 
2.69 1.49 
 
3.38 1.76 
 
-0.77 3.17 
Total 71 5.59 1.24 
 
2.54 1.44 
 
2.66 1.39 
 
0.39 3.24 
Hispanic names 
         
Hispanicness 
Fernando 11 2.36 1.12 
 
6.09 0.83 
 
2.27 1.01 
 
1.45 2.84 
Roberto 12 2.58 1.31 
 
6.00 1.04 
 
2.75 1.36 
 
0.67 2.53 
Miguel 13 2.31 1.11 
 
6.15 0.90 
 
2.23 1.24 
 
1.62 3.15 
Ramiro 11 2.36 1.36 
 
6.00 1.26 
 
2.36 1.43 
 
1.27 3.72 
Gustavo 12 2.42 1.24 
 
5.67 1.23 
 
2.75 1.48 
 
0.50 3.71 
Ramon 12 3.00 1.71 
 
5.92 1.16 
 
2.33 1.30 
 
0.58 3.58 
Total 71 2.51 1.30 
 
5.97 1.06 
 
2.45 1.28 
 
1.01 3.20 
White names 
         
Whiteness 
Connor 14 2.00 1.11 
 
1.71 1.07 
 
6.14 0.95 
 
2.43 2.90 
Bradley 13 3.15 1.63 
 
2.54 1.45 
 
5.85 0.90 
 
0.15 3.63 
Holden 13 2.15 1.46 
 
1.85 1.34 
 
6.23 1.09 
 
2.23 3.14 
Cody 10 2.60 1.35 
 
2.00 1.05 
 
5.80 1.03 
 
1.20 3.19 
Brendan 14 3.50 1.61 
 
2.93 1.69 
 
5.71 0.73 
 
-0.71 3.34 
Brett 13 2.38 1.19 
 
2.38 1.12 
 
6.08 0.86 
 
1.31 2.84 
Greg 10 3.70 1.42 
 
2.40 1.26 
 
5.80 1.14 
 
-0.30 2.75 
Brad 12 2.17 1.11 
 
2.00 1.13 
 
6.08 1.31 
 
1.92 3.29 
Josh 12 3.58 1.16 
 
2.67 1.07 
 
5.25 1.14 
 
-1.00 2.73 
Ian 11 2.45 1.13 
 
2.09 1.30 
 
5.91 0.94 
 
1.36 3.07 
Marty 12 3.08 1.51 
 
1.92 1.08 
 
5.83 1.27 
 
0.83 3.04 
Chip 12 2.00 0.85 
 
1.92 1.00 
 
5.75 1.14 
 
1.83 2.55 
Hank 12 3.25 1.42 
 
2.17 0.94 
 
5.50 1.09 
 
0.08 2.61 
Total 158 2.76 1.41   2.20 1.22   5.85 1.04   0.89 3.12 
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Table 11  
Descriptives for perceived characteristics of names, broken down by stereotypically 
Black, Hispanic, and White names  
  
Likeability 
 
Uniqueness 
 
Wealth 
  n Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Black names 
        
Lamar 12 3.92 1.24 
 
4.25 0.73 
 
3.25 0.81 
Terrell 11 3.30 1.27 
 
3.79 1.52 
 
3.41 1.11 
Darnel 12 3.69 1.05 
 
4.08 1.33 
 
3.42 1.04 
Jerome 11 3.55 0.91 
 
3.15 0.78 
 
3.64 0.60 
Tyrone 12 3.97 1.57 
 
3.31 1.16 
 
3.42 0.95 
Leroy 13 3.36 1.56 
 
2.87 1.13 
 
3.23 1.09 
Total 71 3.63 1.28 
 
3.57 1.21 
 
3.39 0.93 
Hispanic names 
        
Fernando 11 4.39 1.20 
 
3.30 1.29 
 
3.73 1.15 
Roberto 12 4.06 1.02 
 
4.06 1.20 
 
3.79 0.94 
Miguel 13 4.08 1.28 
 
2.74 1.44 
 
3.73 0.63 
Ramiro 11 4.24 1.11 
 
4.39 1.35 
 
3.45 0.88 
Gustavo 12 3.86 1.47 
 
4.92 1.26 
 
3.75 1.03 
Ramon 12 3.97 1.62 
 
3.92 1.52 
 
3.63 0.98 
Total 71 4.09 1.27 
 
3.87 1.49 
 
3.68 0.92 
White names 
        
Connor 14 4.88 1.09 
 
3.40 1.13 
 
4.36 0.66 
Bradley 13 4.41 1.26 
 
2.92 1.00 
 
4.77 1.32 
Holden 13 3.64 1.55 
 
4.64 1.00 
 
4.54 0.80 
Cody 10 4.30 1.29 
 
3.03 1.18 
 
4.45 1.19 
Brendan 14 4.05 1.30 
 
3.26 1.28 
 
4.00 0.76 
Brett 13 3.41 1.10 
 
2.95 1.17 
 
4.38 0.79 
Greg 10 3.57 1.32 
 
2.43 1.07 
 
3.90 0.66 
Brad 12 3.72 0.74 
 
2.61 1.10 
 
3.96 0.92 
Josh 12 4.22 1.16 
 
3.00 0.97 
 
4.13 0.38 
Ian 11 4.76 0.92 
 
3.24 1.36 
 
4.55 0.69 
Marty 12 3.14 1.42 
 
3.69 1.37 
 
3.63 0.53 
Chip 12 2.75 1.23 
 
4.17 1.18 
 
4.25 1.52 
Hank 12 4.08 1.26 
 
2.97 0.98 
 
3.58 0.79 
Total 158 3.92 1.32   3.28 1.25   4.20 0.93 
 
     
 
Table 12 
Correlation matrix for impressions of suspects (n = 339) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Honest 
           
2. Likeable .71** 
          
3. Intelligent .49** .55** 
         
4. Successful .43** .49** .43** 
        
5. Wealthy .33** .32** .26** .65** 
       
6. Dangerous -.59** -.46** -.18** -.19** -0.09 
      
7. Vulnerable .30** .27** .14* .22** .25** -.14* 
     
8. Violent -.59** -.45** -.18** -.18** -0.08 .90** -.14* 
    
9. Bad -.58** -.44** -.25** -.21** -0.11 .80** -.13* .83** 
   
10. Stand up .65** .54** .31** .30** .25** -.55** .31** -.55** -.51** 
  
11. Identify .49** .45** .30** .35** .32** -.31** .21** -.30** -.26** .62** 
 
12. Similar .46** .43** .29** .36** .33** -.31** .20** -.29** -.26** .56** .91** 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 13  
Rotated component matrix for impressions of suspects  
   Component 
Variable Negative characteristics Positive characteristics Identification 
1. Honest 0.61 0.52 0.32 
2. Likeable 0.46 0.62 0.26 
3. Intelligent 0.19 0.66 0.09 
4. Successful 0.06 0.84 0.13 
5. Wealthy -0.07 0.76 0.16 
6. Dangerous 0.92 0.07 0.16 
7. Vulnerable 0.10 0.39 0.17 
8. Violent 0.93 0.06 0.14 
9. Bad 0.89 0.13 0.08 
10. Stand up 0.53 0.27 0.58 
11. Identify 0.15 0.24 0.92 
12. Similar 0.14 0.24 0.91 
Note. Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
normalization. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Descriptives for probability of guilt and legal decision making composite broken down by prime, professional group membership and 
racial group membership 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Probability of guilt 
            
Out-group 43 48.58 25.71 
 
53 60.87 24.89 
 
52 60.31 26.01 
 
40 55.50 23.77 
In-group 39 53.64 24.39 
 
38 59.11 24.19 
 
38 61.42 22.86 
 
36 61.08 25.44 
Total 82 50.99 25.07 
 
91 60.13 24.48 
 
90 60.78 24.60 
 
76 58.14 24.57 
Legal decision making composite 
            
Out-group 43 4.58 2.11 
 
53 5.23 2.37 
 
52 5.25 2.30 
 
40 4.96 2.11 
In-group 39 4.72 2.28 
 
38 5.47 2.16 
 
38 4.93 1.96 
 
36 5.22 2.33 
Total 82 4.65 2.18   91 5.33 2.27   90 5.11 2.16   76 5.08 2.20 
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Table 15 
Descriptives for ratings of the suspect broken down by condition 
 
Mortality Salience (MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Positive characteristics 
             
Out-group 43 3.13 1.17 
 
53 2.97 1.11 
 
52 2.99 1.21 
 
40 2.60 1.03 
In-group 39 2.95 1.28 
 
38 3.15 1.47 
 
38 3.33 1.16 
 
36 2.77 1.12 
Total 82 3.05 1.22 
 
91 3.05 1.27 
 
90 3.14 1.19 
 
76 2.68 1.07 
Negative characteristics 
             
Out-group 43 4.41 2.27 
 
53 5.42 2.18 
 
52 5.49 2.11 
 
40 5.64 2.11 
In-group 39 4.97 2.10 
 
38 5.93 2.08 
 
38 4.61 1.90 
 
36 5.35 2.54 
Total 82 4.67 2.20 
 
91 5.63 2.14 
 
90 5.12 2.06 
 
76 5.50 2.31 
Level of identification 
             
Out-group 43 3.07 1.67 
 
53 2.38 1.39 
 
52 2.72 1.39 
 
40 1.98 1.08 
In-group 39 2.78 1.59 
 
38 2.79 1.79 
 
38 3.06 1.65 
 
36 2.44 1.51 
Total 82 2.93 1.63   91 2.55 1.58   90 2.86 1.51   76 2.20 1.31 
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Table 16 
Descriptives for culpability measures broken down by race of suspect 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Probability of guilt  
              
Black 19 49.16 21.99 
 
32 61.91 28.19 
 
28 64.32 27.14 
 
22 54.59 23.57 
Hispanic 27 47.93 27.71 
 
20 64.25 17.69 
 
29 60.66 23.75 
 
19 51.05 24.35 
White 36 54.25 24.80 
 
39 56.56 24.30 
 
33 57.88 23.42 
 
35 64.23 24.50 
Total 82 50.99 25.07 
 
91 60.13 24.48 
 
90 60.78 24.60 
 
76 58.14 24.57 
Legal decision making composite 
            
Black 19 4.91 1.46 
 
32 5.66 2.31 
 
28 5.50 2.38 
 
22 5.20 2.01 
Hispanic 27 4.23 2.46 
 
20 5.52 2.16 
 
29 5.03 2.15 
 
19 4.35 2.17 
White 36 4.81 2.29 
 
39 4.97 2.30 
 
33 4.86 1.99 
 
35 5.41 2.30 
Total 82 4.65 2.18   91 5.33 2.27   90 5.11 2.16   76 5.08 2.20 
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Table 17 
Correlation matrix for impressions of suspects (n = 339) 
  1 2 
1. Positive impression 
  
2. Negative impression -.45** 
 
3. Perceived similarity to suspect .59** -.45** 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's positive characteristics broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high self-esteem 
            
Out-group suspect 23 3.30 1.24 
 
24 3.05 1.17 
 
32 2.88 1.15 
 
14 2.29 0.94 
In-group suspect 22 3.26 1.22 
 
18 3.36 1.38 
 
20 3.24 1.08 
 
18 2.71 1.28 
Total 45 3.28 1.21 
 
42 3.18 1.25 
 
52 3.02 1.13 
 
32 2.53 1.15 
Participants with low self-esteem 
             
Out-group suspect 20 2.95 1.09 
 
29 2.90 1.08 
 
20 3.18 1.30 
 
26 2.76 1.06 
In-group suspect 17 2.54 1.28 
 
20 2.97 1.57 
 
18 3.43 1.26 
 
18 2.83 0.96 
Total 37 2.76 1.18   49 2.93 1.29   38 3.30 1.27   44 2.79 1.01 
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Table 19 
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's negative characteristics broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high self-esteem 
             
Out-group suspect 23 4.23 2.15 
 
24 5.36 2.22 
 
32 5.35 2.04 
 
14 5.90 2.27 
In-group suspect 22 4.62 1.88 
 
18 5.56 1.96 
 
20 4.73 1.77 
 
18 5.43 2.42 
Total 45 4.42 2.01 
 
42 5.44 2.09 
 
52 5.12 1.95 
 
32 5.64 2.33 
Participants with low self-esteem 
             
Out-group suspect 20 4.62 2.45 
 
29 5.47 2.18 
 
20 5.72 2.24 
 
26 5.50 2.06 
In-group suspect 17 5.41 2.34 
 
20 6.27 2.17 
 
18 4.46 2.09 
 
18 5.28 2.72 
Total 37 4.98 2.40   49 5.80 2.19   38 5.12 2.23   44 5.41 2.32 
 
  
1
1
6
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20 
Descriptives for ratings of perceived similarity to the suspect broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high self-esteem                         
Out-group suspect 23 3.43 1.79  
24 2.47 1.43 
 
32 2.71 1.49 
 
14 1.69 0.89 
In-group suspect 22 2.98 1.43  
18 3.46 1.91 
 
20 2.73 1.55 
 
18 2.63 1.66 
Total 45 3.21 1.62  
42 2.90 1.71 
 
52 2.72 1.50 
 
32 2.22 1.44 
Participants with low self-esteem 
            
Out-group suspect 20 2.65 1.44  
29 2.31 1.38 
 
20 2.73 1.25 
 
26 2.14 1.16 
In-group suspect 17 2.51 1.78  
20 2.18 1.48 
 
18 3.43 1.73 
 
18 2.24 1.36 
Total 37 2.59 1.59   49 2.26 1.41   38 3.06 1.52   44 2.18 1.23 
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Table 21 
Descriptives for ratings of positive characteristics broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of 
presentation 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high professional group identification                   
Suspect rated first 12 2.70 1.15  
11 3.05 0.91 
 
11 2.45 1.15 
 
13 2.89 1.02 
Suspect rated second 11 2.80 1.22 
 
15 2.97 1.67 
 
17 2.96 1.19 
 
15 2.88 1.12 
Total 23 2.75 1.16  
26 3.01 1.38 
 
28 2.76 1.18 
 
28 2.89 1.05 
Participants with low professional group identification 
          
Suspect rated first 10 2.64 1.06 
 
10 3.16 1.54 
 
9 2.98 0.73 
 
9 2.58 1.38 
Suspect rated second 7 3.91 1.06  
14 3.03 1.09 
 
9 3.69 0.73 
 
12 2.33 1.01 
Total 17 3.16 1.21  
24 3.08 1.26 
 
18 3.33 0.80 
 
21 2.44 1.16 
 
  
1
1
8
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22 
Descriptives for ratings of negative characteristics broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of 
presentation 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high professional group identification                     
Suspect rated first 12 6.56 1.62 
 
11 5.18 2.45 
 
11 4.70 2.46 
 
13 5.95 1.69 
Suspect rated second 11 4.48 2.10 
 
15 6.33 2.19 
 
17 5.57 2.28 
 
15 5.24 2.10 
Total 23 5.57 2.11 
 
26 5.85 2.33 
 
28 5.23 2.35 
 
28 5.57 1.92 
Participants with low professional group identification 
          
Suspect rated first 10 3.50 1.72 
 
10 6.20 2.31 
 
9 4.56 2.39 
 
9 4.44 2.42 
Suspect rated second 7 3.33 1.74 
 
14 4.17 2.25 
 
9 4.52 1.62 
 
12 6.08 2.00 
Total 17 3.43 1.68 
 
24 5.01 2.45 
 
18 4.54 1.98 
 
21 5.38 2.29 
 
  
1
1
9
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23 
Descriptives for perceived similarity to the suspect broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of 
presentation 
 
Mortality Salience (MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high professional group identification 
          
Suspect rated first 12 1.81 0.86 
 
11 2.15 1.10 
 
11 2.55 1.31 
 
13 2.18 1.40 
Suspect rated second 11 2.79 1.71 
 
15 3.04 2.13 
 
17 2.78 1.64 
 
15 2.29 1.29 
Total 23 2.28 1.40 
 
26 2.67 1.80 
 
28 2.69 1.50 
 
28 2.24 1.32 
Participants with low professional group identification 
          
Suspect rated first 10 3.07 1.15 
 
10 1.90 1.10 
 
9 2.89 1.12 
 
9 2.59 1.89 
Suspect rated second 7 4.00 2.19 
 
14 2.57 0.78 
 
9 2.89 2.07 
 
12 1.44 0.50 
Total 17 3.45 1.67   24 2.29 0.96   18 2.89 1.62   21 1.94 1.38 
 
  
1
2
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Table 24 
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's positive characteristics broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group 
identification, and order of presentation 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high racial group identification                     
Suspect rated first 5 3.84 1.82 
 
5 2.00 0.99 
 
8 2.80 1.64 
 
9 2.16 0.76 
Suspect rated second 11 2.56 1.27 
 
14 3.63 1.04 
 
8 3.58 1.24 
 
12 3.00 1.16 
Total 16 2.96 1.53 
 
19 3.20 1.24 
 
16 3.19 1.46 
 
21 2.64 1.07 
Participants with low racial group identification 
           
 
Suspect rated first 10 2.64 1.29 
 
16 2.94 0.84 
 
13 2.75 0.72 
 
8 3.28 1.13 
Suspect rated second 11 3.64 1.19 
 
11 3.29 1.29 
 
5 3.64 0.91 
 
8 3.73 1.75 
Total 21 3.16 1.31 
 
27 3.08 1.04 
 
18 3.00 0.85 
 
16 3.50 1.44 
 
  
1
2
1
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's negative characteristics broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group identification, 
and order of presentation 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high racial group identification                     
Suspect rated first 5 6.13 1.99 
 
5 5.73 2.95 
 
8 5.92 3.54 
 
9 7.37 0.63 
Suspect rated second 11 5.82 2.81 
 
14 4.38 2.47 
 
8 5.42 1.76 
 
12 6.31 2.26 
Total 16 5.92 2.52 
 
19 4.74 2.59 
 
16 5.67 2.71 
 
21 6.76 1.81 
Participants with low racial group identification 
           
Suspect rated first 10 5.20 1.74 
 
16 5.63 1.94 
 
13 4.62 1.60 
 
8 4.54 1.01 
Suspect rated second 11 5.03 1.19 
 
11 5.03 1.72 
 
5 3.80 1.80 
 
8 4.25 2.62 
Total 21 5.11 1.44 
 
27 5.38 1.84 
 
18 4.39 1.65 
 
16 4.40 1.93 
 
  
1
2
2
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26 
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's perceived similarity with the suspect broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group 
identification, and order of presentation 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
 
In-group suspect 
 
Out-group suspect 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Participants with high racial group identification                     
Suspect rated first 5 3.87 2.12 
 
5 1.47 0.73 
 
8 2.38 1.54 
 
9 1.48 0.41 
Suspect rated second 11 2.91 1.89 
 
14 3.62 1.88 
 
8 3.67 1.78 
 
12 2.50 1.34 
Total 16 3.21 1.95 
 
19 3.05 1.90 
 
16 3.02 1.74 
 
21 2.06 1.15 
Participants with low racial group identification 
           
Suspect rated first 10 2.30 1.45 
 
16 2.19 1.31 
 
13 2.67 1.28 
 
8 3.67 1.43 
Suspect rated second 11 3.45 1.74 
 
11 2.91 1.43 
 
5 3.33 1.27 
 
8 2.71 1.31 
Total 21 2.90 1.68 
 
27 2.48 1.38 
 
18 2.85 1.28 
 
16 3.19 1.41 
 
  
1
2
3
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
Descriptives for punitiveness and recidivism broken down by condition 
 
Mortality Salience (MS) 
 
Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Punitiveness 
             
Out-group 43 5.40 1.31 
 
53 5.26 1.30 
 
52 5.40 1.21 
 
40 4.98 1.25 
In-group 39 5.18 1.05 
 
38 5.55 1.18 
 
38 5.63 1.08 
 
36 5.25 1.54 
Total 82 5.29 1.19 
 
91 5.38 1.25 
 
90 5.50 1.15 
 
76 5.11 1.39 
Predicted receidivism 
             
Out-group 43 2.97 1.65 
 
53 2.60 1.34 
 
52 2.43 1.01 
 
40 2.84 1.59 
In-group 39 3.35 1.40 
 
38 2.83 1.48 
 
38 2.62 1.45 
 
36 2.49 1.23 
Total 82 3.15 1.54   91 2.70 1.39   90 2.51 1.22   76 2.67 1.43 
 
 
  
1
2
4
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 
Descriptives for Study 2 follow up questions broken down by condition 
  Mortality Salience (MS)   Dental Pain (DP) 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
 
Police investigator 
 
Journalist 
  n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD   n Mean SD 
Perceived case realism 
              
Black 19 5.42 1.35 
 
32 5.72 1.59 
 
28 6.07 0.81 
 
22 5.77 1.31 
Hispanic 27 6.00 1.11 
 
20 6.10 0.79 
 
29 6.21 1.08 
 
19 6.00 1.45 
White 36 5.36 1.25 
 
39 6.00 1.24 
 
33 5.67 1.32 
 
35 6.11 1.13 
Total 82 5.59 1.25 
 
91 5.92 1.29 
 
90 5.97 1.12 
 
76 5.99 1.26 
Motivation to solve case  
             
Black 19 6.11 0.99 
 
32 5.53 1.55 
 
28 5.93 1.39 
 
22 5.18 1.71 
Hispanic 27 5.78 1.22 
 
20 5.45 1.67 
 
29 5.90 1.24 
 
19 5.32 1.57 
White 36 5.08 1.25 
 
39 5.38 1.29 
 
33 5.73 1.63 
 
35 5.86 1.38 
Total 82 5.55 1.25 
 
91 5.45 1.46 
 
90 5.84 1.42 
 
76 5.53 1.54 
Ratings of feedback accuracy 
            
Black 19 3.84 2.65 
 
32 4.16 2.53 
 
28 4.07 2.52 
 
22 3.68 2.70 
Hispanic 27 4.00 2.54 
 
20 4.15 2.58 
 
29 4.34 2.41 
 
19 4.42 1.98 
White 36 3.75 2.18 
 
39 4.08 2.46 
 
33 4.30 2.76 
 
35 4.03 2.47 
Total 82 3.85 2.39 
 
91 4.12 2.49 
 
90 4.24 2.55 
 
76 4.03 2.41 
Reaction to feedback 
              
Black 19 4.84 2.32 
 
32 5.31 2.28 
 
28 5.39 2.04 
 
22 4.91 2.09 
Hispanic 27 5.48 2.49 
 
20 5.40 1.93 
 
29 6.00 2.12 
 
19 4.63 2.01 
White 36 4.86 1.48 
 
39 5.13 2.26 
 
33 5.45 2.14 
 
35 5.11 1.89 
Total 82 5.06 2.05   91 5.25 2.18   90 5.61 2.10   76 4.93 1.96 
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Figure 1. Graph of predicted main effect of case outcome and interaction between prime and 
case outcome on affective reactions to the outcome of the case, in Study 1.  
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Figure 2. Graph of predicted three-way interaction for Study 2 between prime, group 
membership, and racial group membership on measures of derogation of the suspect.    
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Figure 3. Graph of the predicted two-way interaction for Study 2 between prime and race of the 
suspect on judgment of guilt.   
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Figure 4. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between prime, suspect race, and professional group membership on 
probability of guilt.   
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Figure 5. Graph of the four-way interaction found in Study 2 between prime, order of presentation, level of professional identification, 
and professional group membership on negative impressions of the suspect.  
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Figure 6. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between racial group membership, order of presentation, and level of 
professional identification on positive impressions of the suspect.  
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Figure 7. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between racial group membership, order of presentation, and level of 
professional identification on perceived similarity to the suspect.  
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APPENDIX A. Bogus Personality Assessment
5
 
EPQR-A questionnaire (Francis, Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992) 
Please select Yes or No to answer each question about yourself in general. 
1. Does your mood often go up and down? ** 
2. Are you a talkative person? 
3. Would being in debt worry you? ** 
4. Are you rather lively? 
5. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than your share of anything? 
6. Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects? 
7. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you knew was really your fault? ** 
8. Do you always practice what you preach? ** 
9. Do you prefer to go your own way rather than act by the rules? ** 
10. Do you often feel ‘fed-up’? ** 
11. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or button) that belonged to someone else? 
12. Would you call yourself a nervous person? 
13. Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and should be done away with? ** 
14. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party? 
15. Are you a worrier? 
16. Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions? ** 
17. Does it worry you if you know there are mistakes in your work? 
18. Have you ever cheated at a game? 
19. Do you suffer from ‘nerves’? 
20. Have you ever taken advantage of someone? ** 
21. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people? ** 
22. Do you often feel lonely? 
23. Is it better to follow society’s rules than go your own way? 
24. Do other people think of you as being very lively? ** 
Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987)  
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by choosing the item 
on the scale corresponding to your belief
6
.  
1. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice. 
2. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) are the 
exception rather than the rule. 
3. I think that people try to be fair when making important decisions. 
4. I am convinced in the long run people will be compensated for injustices. 
5. I believe that, by and large, people get what they fairly deserve. 
6. I think basically the world is a just place. 
                                                          
5
 Questions that were included in Study 1 are marked **. All questions were included in Study 2.  
6
 Participants responded on a 7-point scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree” 
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OCEAN questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 1987) 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, and roughly your same age
7
.  
1. I am the life of the party ** 
2. I feel little concern for others ** 
3. I am always prepared ** 
4. I get stressed out easily ** 
5. I have a rich vocabulary 
6. I don't talk a lot ** 
7. I am interested in people ** 
8. I leave my belongings around ** 
9. I am relaxed most of the time ** 
10. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas ** 
11. I feel comfortable around people ** 
12. I insult people 
13. I pay attention to details ** 
14. I worry about things ** 
15. I have a vivid imagination ** 
16. I keep in the background 
17. I sympathize with others' feelings 
18. I make a mess of things 
19. I seldom feel blue 
20. I am not interested in abstract ideas 
21. I start conversations 
22. I am not interested in other people's problems 
23. I get chores done right away 
24. I am easily disturbed 
25. I have excellent ideas ** 
26. I have little to say 
27. I have a soft heart 
28. I often forget to put things back in their proper place 
29. I get upset easily 
30. I do not have a good imagination 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Participants responded on a 5-point scale from “very accurate” to “very inaccurate” 
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Priming manipulation 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research 
suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount 
about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in 
order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following 
questions will be appreciated. 
1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of [your own death/ going to the dentist] 
arouses in you. 
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically 
[die/go to the dentist] and once you are physically [dead/at the dentist]. 
 
Word search distraction task 
Find and write down 6 words in this puzzle that have more than 3 letters. The words can be in 
any direction. 
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Word stem completion task (Manipulation check for the MS manipulation) 
Please complete the following by filling letters in the blanks to create words.  Please fill in the 
blanks with the first word that comes to mind, as fast as you can. If you cannot think of a word, 
move on to the next word. Some words may be plural. 
1. BUR _ _ D (buried) 
 
9. M _ J _ R 
 
17. W _ _ DOW 
2. PL _ _ 
 
10. P _ _ TURE 
 
18. TR _ _ 
3. _ _ OK 
 
11. FL _ W _ R 
 
19. P _ P _ R 
4. WAT _ _ 
 
12. GRA _ _ (grave) 
 
20. COFF _ _ (coffin) 
5. DE _ _ (dead) 
 
13. K _ _ GS 
 
21. _ O _ SE 
6. MU _ _ 
 
14. CHA _ _ 
 
22. POST _ _ 
7. _ _ NG 
 
15. CO _ _ SE 
(corpse) 
 
23. R _ DI _ 
8. B _ T _ LE 
 
16. TAB _ _ 
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APPENDIX B. Study 1 – Case File 
The personality portion of the survey is now over.  
You are now going to read the case file for a police investigation of an armed robbery case. All 
names in this case have been removed for anonymity purposes. Suspect #1 is referred to as M.  
While reading through the materials, please imagine that you are the lead investigator in this 
case. You responded to the initial call with your partner, Officer Young. You are responsible for 
making the decisions in the investigation and you are responsible for the outcome of this case.  
The materials you are about to read are what you have collected so far. 
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously 
viewed pages. 
As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your investigation. 
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APPENDIX C. Study 1 – Lines of Investigation Dependent Variables 
If you had to investigate this case over again, knowing what you now know, would you gather 
more evidence before sending this case to the prosecutor? (Very Unlikely to Very Likely, 7-point 
scale)  
 
 
If you could investigate this case over, how useful would you find pursuing each of the following 
lines of evidence? 
Incriminating lines: 
1. Interrogating M. to try to get him to confess to committing the crime. 
2. Looking through J.'s apartment for more physical evidence tying M. to the crime. 
3. Questioning M.'s cousins further to poke holes in his alibi. 
4. Searching M.'s criminal record to find similar past offenses. 
Exonerating lines: 
1. Asking M. if he had any enemies who might have tried to frame him. 
2. Questioning J.'s family and friends to find if anyone other than M. might have a motive to hurt 
her. 
3. Having J. tested to identify any residual effects from the traumatic brain injury that might have 
distorted her memory of the crime. 
4. Questioning J. about other potential suspects. 
Neutral lines:  
1. Trying to locate the cell phone and/or laptop. 
2. Sending M. for a psychological evaluation. 
3. Finding out what the make and model B.'s car was. 
4. Interviewing M.'s Aunt. 
 
If you had to investigate this case over again, knowing what you now know, would you gather 
more evidence before sending this case to the prosecutor? (Open-ended) 
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Appendix D. Demographics Questionnaire 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other 
What is your age? ____________________ 
What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian 
 Black/African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Native American 
 Pacific Islander 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School / GED 
 Some College 
 2-year College Degree 
 4-year College Degree 
 Masters Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 Other 
What is your employment status? 
 Full time 
 Part time 
 Student 
 Retired 
 Unemployed 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
How would you evaluate your political views? 
 Liberal 
 Slightly Liberal 
 Slightly Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Other 
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Appendix E. Study 2 – Sample Case File  
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Appendix F. Study 2 and Feedback Pilot – Self-esteem Scales and PANAS 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement
8
. 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.   
2. At times I think I am no good at all. (R) 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.   
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (R)  
6. I certainly feel useless at times. (R) 
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. (R) 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (R) 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.  
Social self-esteem subscale of Heatherton and Polivy’s State self-esteem scale (1991)9 
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There is, of 
course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself at 
this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain of the best answer. 
Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW
10
.  
 
1. I feel confident about my abilities.  
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. (R)  
3. I feel that others respect and admire me.  
4. I feel self-conscious. (R)  
5. I feel displeased with myself. (R)  
6. I feel good about myself.  
7. I am worried about what other people think of me. (R)  
8. I feel inferior to others at this moment. (R)  
9. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. (R) 
10. I am worried about looking foolish. (R) 
                                                          
8
 Participants responded on a 4-point scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. In the 
personality feedback pilot, questions were split between even and odd numbers. Half of the 
participants were asked the even numbered questions as a pretest and odd numbers as a posttest 
the other half saw the odd numbered questions as pretest and even numbered questions as 
posttest.  
9
 Used only to pilot the personality feedback 
10 Participants responded on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = very 
much, and 5 = extremely). Questions were also split in half (by even and odd question numbers) 
and order of which half was used as a pretest and posttest was counterbalanced.  
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PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent 
you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel at this time. Use the following scale to record 
your answers
11
. 
Interested  Strong  Enthusiastic  Ashamed  Attentive  
Distressed  Guilty  Proud  Inspired  Jittery  
Excited  Scared  Irritable  Nervous  Active  
Upset  Hostile  Alert  Determined  Afraid  
  
                                                          
11
 Participants responded on a 5-point scale from “Very slightly or not at all” to “Extremely”. 
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Appendix G. Names Pilot – Questionnaire 
We are trying to gather people's honest first impressions of different names. You will be 
presented with six different names. Please indicate on the scales presented how much you 
disagree or agree with the statements about each name
12
. 
 
1. I dislike this name 
2. This name seems different 
3. I think that this person is wealthy 
4. I think this is a good name 
5. This name does not seem unique 
6. I believe this individual would be from a lower social class 
7. I think this name is unusual 
8. I would highly recommend this name 
9. I would expect a person with this name to be White 
10. I would expect a person with this name to be Black 
11. I would expect a person with this name to be Hispanic 
 
 
  
                                                          
12
 Participants responded on a 7-point scale from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”. 
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Appendix H. Study 2 – Feedback Manipulation and Case Instructions 
Personality feedback for the police investigator group 
Based on your responses to the previous questionnaires we assessed your personality on several 
factors and found that you would be well matched for a career as a police investigator.  
Your personality is similar to others who have gone into law enforcement and related fields and 
have done extremely well.   
Given your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use your 
natural abilities and play the part of a police investigator. 
 
Personality feedback for the journalist group 
Based on your responses to the previous questionnaires we assessed your personality on several 
factors and found that you would be well matched for a career as a journalist.  
Your personality is similar to others who have gone into journalism and related fields and have 
done extremely well.   
Given your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use your 
natural abilities and play the part of a journalist. 
  
Instructions for the police investigator group 
The personality portion of the survey is now over.   
You are now going to read the case file for the investigation of an armed robbery. Last names in 
this case have been removed for anonymity purposes.    
Because of your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use 
your natural abilities and take on the role of a police investigator.  
While reading through the materials, imagine that you are the lead police investigator on this 
case.  Please take a moment to think about what being a police investigator entails.     
The materials you are about to read are what you and your partner Officer Young have collected 
so far.   
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously 
viewed pages.  As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your investigation. 
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Instructions for the journalist group 
The personality portion of the survey is now over.   
You are now going to read the case file for the investigation of an armed robbery. Last names in 
this case have been removed for anonymity purposes.    
Because of your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use 
your natural abilities and take on the role of a journalist.  
While reading through the materials, imagine that you are a journalist gathering information 
from the case for a report you are writing about it. Please take a moment to think about what 
being a journalist entails.    
The materials you are about to read are what the investigators have collected so far.   
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously 
viewed pages. As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your report. 
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Appendix I. Study 2 – Measures of Level of Group Identification  
Questions were rated on 9-point scales.  
Questions 1-7: 1 = not at all, 9 = very much 
Question 8: 1 = not favorable at all, 9 = very favorable 
 
 
This series of questions was asked using the professional group identification participants were 
randomly assigned to (i.e., police investigator, or journalist).  
 
1. How much would you stand up for [the police/journalists]?  
2. How much do you identify with being a [police investigator/journalist]?  
3. How much of a feeling of belonging do you have as a [police investigator/journalist]?  
4. How important was being a [police investigator/journalist] to your sense of self? 
5. How much did you like being a [police investigator/journalist] as a whole? 
6. How similar do you feel to [police investigators/journalists]?  
7. How well do you feel you fit as a [police investigator/journalist]?  
8. What is your overall impression of [the police/journalists]? 
  
This series of questions was asked using the race participants identified as (i.e., Black, Hispanic, 
or White).  
 
 
1. How much would you stand up for [Black/Hispanic/White] people?  
2. How much do you identify with being [Black/Hispanic/White]?  
3. How much of a feeling of belonging do you have as a [Black/Hispanic/White] person?  
4. How important is being [Black/Hispanic/White] to your sense of self? 
5. How much do you like being [Black/Hispanic/White] as a whole? 
6. How similar do you feel to [Black/Hispanic/White] people?  
7. How well do you feel you fit as a [Black/Hispanic/White] person?  
8. What is your overall impression of [Black/Hispanic/White] people? 
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